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Controlling shareholders and payout policy: Do founding families 






Around the world (with the U.S. and U.K. as exceptions) concentrated ownership 
structures and controlling shareholders are predominant even among listed firms. We provide 
novel empirical evidence how such controlling shareholders, in particular founding families, 
affect payout policy decisions. Thereby, we use a unique panel dataset of 660 listed firms in 
the 1995 to 2006 period from Germany, an economy that is traditionally characterized by 
concentrated ownership structures and strong family capitalism. We find that family firms 
exhibit a higher propensity and level for both dividend payments and total payouts. This result 
is driven by family ownership rather than family management. Conflicts between the 
founding family and non-family controlling shareholders and tensions within the founding 
family are important determinants of payout policy. While family blockholder increase the 
propensity for a payout to shareholders, outside blockholder have an opposing effect. Finally, 
we find that common action problems and conflicts among a multitude of family members 
and/or generations in “real family firms” lead to a higher “taste for dividend payments” if 
compared to firms dominated by the founder (“founder-controlled firms”). Our results prove 
to be stable against a battery of robustness tests including a matching estimator technique to 
demonstrate causal effects. Overall, our paper contributes to two strands of literature: the 
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„They [family firms] are easily the commonest kind of corporate structure on the planet, and they 
show no signs of disappearing. Whether the company is Wal-Mart, Gucci, Cargill, Hyundai or most of 
Germany's Mittelstand and Latin America's grupos, a family firm is different in important ways from a 
firm in which a family plays no significant part…….. 
……Indeed, managing the family's relationship with the firm can be as hard as managing the 
business itself. There may be tensions between family and non-family shareholders; but there may also 
be rifts between family members who do and don't work in the business. The owner-managers may 
want to plough back as much money as possible; the family outside the business may want generous 
dividends, especially if there is no ready market for their shares.“ 
 
The Economist, December 2000 
 
Starting with the pathbreaking work by Lintner (1956) and Modigliani and Miller 
(1961), corporate payout policy is a topic that is traditionally on the agenda of research in 
financial economics. Just recently, DeAngelo et al. (2009) provided a comprehensive survey 
of this literature. They argue that security valuation problems related to asymmetric 
information between informed corporate insiders and uninformed outside investors (such as in 
Myers and Majluf (1984)) and agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) are suitable to 
explain the majority of the observed payout policy phenomena – the massive payouts over the 
last decades, their timing over the firm’s life cycle and the decision to use regular dividends, 
special dividends or share repurchases as vehicles for the distribution of corporate earnings to 
shareholders.  
In this paper we analyze how company founders and their families as well as other 
controlling shareholders influence corporate payout policy. As indicated in the statement of 
the Economist, family firms are distinct from non-family firms along several important 
dimensions. We make use of this phenomenon and test whether typical family firm 
characteristics, such as lower agency costs between managers and shareholders, the long-term 
commitment of the founding family or their control considerations affect payout policy 
decisions. This seems to be interesting from two different perspectives: First, despite the 
world-wide importance of family firms (see LaPorta et al. (1999), Claessens et al. (2000), 
Faccio and Lang (2002), Bennedsen and Nielson (2010) or the Economist statement) detailed 
empirical evidence on their payout policy choices is so far missing. Second, the impact of 
controlling shareholders in general on payout policy is also a largely unexplored topic. Hence, 
this paper contributes to two strands of literature: the emerging literature on family firms and 
the more mature literature on corporate payout policy. In their recent survey DeAngelo et al. 
(2009) argue in the same direction and conclude that “the influence of controlling 
stockholders on payout policy – particularly in non-US firms, where controlling stockholders 
are common – is a promising area for future research” (DeAngelo et al. 2009, p. 100).  
This paper builds exactly on this research gap by providing novel empirical evidence 
on corporate payout policy decisions of controlling shareholders outside the U.S. In particular, 
we explore the influence of company founders and their families on (i) the payout propensity 
and level. We also analyze (ii) their preferred vehicle of payout (dividends vs. share   4
repurchases) and (iii) whether their decisions are driven by family ownership or family 
management. Moreover, referring to the statement of the Economist we focus on (iv) tensions 
within the founding family and (v) potential conflicts of the founding family with other non-
family shareholders.
 
To explore these issues, Germany provides an ideal economic setting as a country that 
is not only characterized by traditionally concentrated ownership structures (see e.g. LaPorta 
et al. (1999), Becht and Roell (1999), Becht and Böhmer (2003)) and strong family capitalism 
(Fohlin (2007), Franks et al. (2009)), but also by a comparatively weak investor protection, at 
least if compared to the U.S. and U.K. (LaPorta et al. (1997, 1998, 2000a) as well as the 
subsequent “law and finance”-literature surveyed in LaPorta et al. (2008)).
1 For example, in 
our panel dataset on 660 exchange-listed non-financial firms in the German CDAX (which is 
the broadest stock index representing about 95% of the market capitalization) from 1995 to 
2006, we find that founding families continue to exert significant influence over their family 
businesses. Thereby, we define a sample firm as a family firm if the founding family has at 
least 25% of voting rights or if it has at least 5% of the voting rights and a family member is 
represented in the management and/or supervisory board.
2 Based on such a definition, family 
firms represent about 39% of all non-financial CDAX-firms and 23% of the CDAX market 
capitalization (cf. table 1 for a detailed overview of the sample composition). Within the 
family firms, the founding family retains a strong influence over the corporate decision 
making. In particular, the founding family holds on average about 45% of all voting rights and 
a seat in either the management or the supervisory board in about 91% of all cases. Our 
exclusive focus on founding families (rather than individual family shareholders in general) is 
justified by recent research indicating that founding families compromise a distinct group of 
controlling shareholders even if compared to other controlling, (non-founding) family 
shareholders (Villalonga and Amit (2009b)). 
Following this literature, such family firms are characterized by the following distinct 
features that make them to an interesting test object in the context of payout policy decisions: 
As large shareholders founding families can overcome the free-rider problem commonly 
associated with atomistic shareholder structures and hence they have strong incentives to 
provide effective shareholder monitoring (Grossman and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny 
(1986)). Moreover, in comparison to other types of external blockholders (such as strategic or 
financial investors) they are often actively involved in running the daily business. In a two-tier 
                                                 
1 Although beginning in 1995 Germany underwent several regulatory initiatives (partly driven by EU directions) 
that have continuously increased transparency, investor protection and accountability in the German financial 
system, the main features of its corporate governance regime including the concentrated ownership structures, 
the prevalence of controlling shareholders and the lack of an active market for corporate control remain 
unchanged until today (Goergen et al. (2008a and 2008b)). 
2 Please note that we use a similar but more restrictive definition in comparison to the existing literature, e.g. 
Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b), Villalonga and Amit (2006) for the U.S., Sraer and Thesmar (2007) for 
France or Andres (2007, 2008) and Ampenberger et al. (2009) for Germany. Our definition is similar since we 
also use the founding family’s involvement in the firm’s governance structure to define a family firm. However, 
family ownership seems to be of critical importance for the desire to receive corporate payouts. In this sense, our 
definition is more restrictive than the ones used in previous empirical studies since we have decided to limit our 
family firm definition to such cases in which the founding family has at least 5% of voting rights even if family 
members are represented in the management and/or supervisory board. A similar definition was recently used by 
Deutsche Börse, operator of the German stock exchange, to introduce the DAX plus family in 2010 – a stock 
index measuring the performance of family firms listed at the Prime Standard of Frankfurt stock exchange.   5
governance structure,
3 which is the case among listed firms in Germany, the founding family 
often is represented in the management or supervisory board. Such seats in the two governing 
bodies provide a direct channel for the founding family to exert strong influence on the 
corporate decision making. From this perspective, family firms are characterized by lower 
agency conflicts between managers and shareholders (agency conflict I).  
Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue that dividends and debt 
are useful instruments to reduce agency problems stemming from the shareholder-manager 
conflict. Such agency problems include but are not limited to deliberate managerial 
misbehavior, such as empire building, consumption-on-the-job and tunneling (Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), Johnson et al. (2000)). In a broader sense, such agency problems can also 
include behavioral managerial biases, such as overconfidence or managerial hubris (Roll 
(1986), Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008), DeAngelo et al. (2009)). If this agency conflict I 
and henceforth agency costs of free cash flow (Jensen (1986)) are less severe in family firms, 
we expect them to have a lower payout propensity and level in comparison to non-family 
firms. In particular, we suppose that this phenomenon is driven mostly by the active 
participation of the founding family in the firm’s management or supervisory board. Hence, 
we pose this as the agency cost hypothesis of family management. 
Otherwise, founding families have a strong need to remain control over the family 
business. They provide “patient capital” and long-term commitment, often spanning over 
more than one family generation (James (1999)).
4 In many cases, the reputation of the 
founding family is closely related to the reputation and economic success of the family 
business (Dyer and Whetten (2006)). Finally, the founding family has a strong intrinsic 
motivation to preserve family wealth and bequeath the family business to future generations 
(Casson (1999), Chami (2001), Villalonga and Amit (2009b)). If the members of the founding 
family intend to remain control over the family business, any dilution of their ownership (and 
voting rights) by selling their ownership stake is not appropriate. However, if they at the same 
time do not want to abstain from a steady income, they might have a strong desire for a 
continuous payout. This “taste for dividends” might be pronounced if there are common 
action problems within a multitude of family members and/or family generations (DeAngelo 
et al. (2009)). Such conflicts and disagreements within the family are exactly described in the 
Economist’s statement at the beginning of our article. Following these arguments, we expect 
family firms to have a higher payout propensity and level. In particular, we expect family 
ownership to be the driving channel for the higher payout propensity and level in family 
firms. Moreover, we expect that the desire for payout is stronger if there are non-founder 
                                                 
3 Traditionally, Germany is classified by a two-tier corporate governance structure with the management board 
(Vorstand) being responsible for the management decisions concerning the daily business and the supervisory 
board (Aufsichtsrat) for monitoring the management board. Thereby, the management board is a committee 
appointed by the supervisory board which itself is compromised by shareholder representatives (and subject to 
legal requirements potentially additional employee representatives). Among others, Gorton and Schmid (2004) 
or Fauver and Fürst (2006) provide a detailed description of the German two-tier corporate governance structure. 
4 For example, Franks et al. (2009) show that family ownership in Continental Europe is enduring. They analyze 
information on the ownership structure of the 1.000 largest private and exchange-listed firms (in terms of sales) 
in Germany, Italy and France at two points of time, in 1996 and 2006. One interesting result of their study is that 
of all family firms in 1996, 74% (Germany), 78% (Italy) and 64% (France) are still family firms in 2006. This is 
a strong indication for the long-term commitment of family shareholders, at least in a Continental European 
institutional setting.   6
family owners. We combine these aspects in our income and control hypothesis of family 
ownership. 
We contribute to the literature along several important dimensions: First, with regard 
to the literature on family firms the majority of studies has so far focused on issues of 
corporate performance (Anderson and Reeb (2003a), Villalonga and Amit (2006), Maury 
(2006), Miller et al. (2007), Barontini and Caprio (2008), Fahlenbrach (2009) among others), 
the impact of succession problems (Perez-Gonzalez (2006), Bennedsen et al. (2007), Bloom 
and van Reenen (2007), Cuculleli and Micucci (2008), Adams et al. (2009)) or the wedge 
between cash-flow and voting rights (Claessens et al. (2002), Villalonga and Amit (2006), 
Villalonga and Amit (2009a), Bennedsen and Nilson (2010)). There seems to be a consensus 
in the literature that family firms show a better performance at least if there is no wedge 
between cash-flow and voting rights and the founder is still active in firm management. In 
addition, several studies suggest that the critical event of a “within-family succession” is on 
average destroying firm value; at least if the succession decision is not based on the careful 
selection of a well-qualified member within the family. However, the reasons for the observed 
differences in corporate performance are largely unexplored. In this sense, our study 
complements the emerging literature on corporate decision making in family firms regarding 
capital structure, investment policy or payout decisions (cf. Mishra and McConaughy (1999), 
Anderson and Reeb (2003b), Ellul (2009), Fahlenbrach (2009), Anderson et al. (2009), 
Ampenberger et al. (2009) among others). Thereby, to our best knowledge, this is the first 
analysis of payout policy decisions in a corporate governance regime like Germany, where 
concentrated ownership structures and controlling shareholders are common even among 
listed firms (LaPorta et al. (1999), Faccio and Lang (2002)).
5  
In a first step, we use probit regression models to show that family firms have a 
significantly higher propensity for dividend payments (and total payouts) if compared to non-
family firms. Consistent with the income and control hypothesis of family ownership the 
higher propensity for dividends (and total payouts) is driven by family ownership rather than 
family management. Even in times the firm realizes a loss family firms have a higher 
propensity for dividend payments, suggesting that their payout decisions are more continuous.  
In a second step, we analyze payout ratios. In principle, firms can use two vehicles to 
distribute earnings among shareholders: Dividends and share repurchases. We focus on 
dividend payout ratios as dividends are of predominant importance in Germany relative to 
share repurchases. There are only 389 share repurchase events in the 1995 to 2006 period and 
share repurchases account for less than 10% of total payout volume over the whole sample 
period. The low importance of share repurchases relative to dividends is related to the German 
stock corporation act (AktG) which limits share repurchases to a maximum of 10% of the 
ordinary share capital (§ 71 AktG). Before 1998, share repurchases were even generally 
prohibited by law and only allowed under very restrictive circumstances. However, we have 
additionally reported the results for the payout ratio based on share repurchases and total 
                                                 
5 To our best knowledge, the only other exception in the literature that deals with issues of payout policy in 
family firms is the working paper by Hu et al. (2009). However, this paper focuses on payout policy decisions in 
the context of U.S. family firms in the S&P-500, an institutional setting where controlling shareholders and 
concentrated ownership structures are less prevalent.   7
payouts in the appendix. This allows us to show that our results for dividend payout ratios 
hold in general also for total payout ratios (but not for payout ratios in terms of share 
repurchases). We show that family firms have a higher dividend payout ratio, measured as 
percentage of earnings. Consistent with the control theory and the desire for a continuous 
income we find again that family ownership is the main channel for the higher level of 
dividends. Thereby, we use pooled OLS-regressions, random-effects and firm-fixed effects 
models. The firm-fixed effects models allow us to control for unobserved, time-constant 
heterogeneity in firm characteristics. 
We further argue that conflicts within the founding family seem to be an important 
issue. Following Miller et al. (2007) in terms of methodology, we compare two types of 
family firms: “Founder-controlled firms” and “real family firms”. In real family firms, other 
family members (not the founder) are involved simultaneously or over time. Thereby, these 
other family members can be large owners (in fact, with at least 25% of voting rights) or they 
hold 5% of the voting rights and are represented in top-management. By contrast, founder-
controlled firms are firms which are still dominated by the founder himself. Thereby, this 
comparison between the two groups yields significant differences in terms of payout policy 
decisions. While both types of family firms have a higher propensity to pay out dividends 
(and total payouts) if compared to non-family firms, we find that regarding the dividend 
payout ratio only the real family firms have a higher payout ratio relative to non-family firms.  
Finally, we argue that there seem to be significant tensions between family and non-
family shareholders. For example, we find in all our models regarding the payout propensity 
that the existence of non-family controlling shareholders in contrast to family shareholders 
has a significant negative influence on the payout propensity. This result is robust if we 
distinguish according to the type of the controlling outside shareholder in (i) strategic 
shareholders, (ii) financial investors, (iii) government shareholders, and (iv) individual 
shareholders. While strategic and financial investors exhibit a significant negative correlation 
with the propensity for dividend payments, the dummy variable for government and 
individual shareholders is insignificant. However, the influence of family shareholders on the 
propensity to pay dividends remains strong and positive. Furthermore, we show that the 
likelihood for payouts increases with the voting power of the founding family (measured 
relative to the voting power of other non-family shareholders with at least 5% of voting 
rights). Overall, our results confirm the anecdotal evidence in the Economist statement that 
both  tensions within the founding family and conflicts between family and non-family 
shareholders are important determinants of corporate payout policy. 
In order to alleviate concerns of endogeneity, we apply a propensity score based 
matching procedure. The interpretation of this matching estimator suggests that the propensity 
for dividend payments (and total payouts in general) significantly decreases if the firm 
experiences a transition from a family firm to a non-family firm. Overall, this test proposes a 
causal link (rather than a simple correlation) between family firm characteristics and payout 
policy. Regarding the dividend payout ratio we perform a similar matching estimator 
corroborating our findings from the OLS-, the random-effects- and fixed-effects-regressions. 
Finally, our results prove to be stable against a battery of further robustness tests including   8
misspecification issues, sample composition aspects, tax regime effects and insider ownership 
effects. 
Second, with regard to the more mature literature on corporate payout policy, we 
contribute by analyzing how and why influential shareholders affect payout policy. In contrast 
to previous studies that focused on tax preferences of influential shareholders (Lie and Lie 
(1999), Perez-Gonzalez (2002), Hsieh and Wang (2008) among others) we focus on agency 
aspects and control motives. For such an analysis, Germany’s typical Continental European 
setting with its concentrated ownership structures and the strong corporate governance role of 
controlling shareholders provides an ideal research environment. Our analysis presents novel 
empirical evidence that in such a corporate governance regime controlling shareholders have 
a strong impact on payout decisions. While family shareholders prefer higher payouts, large 
non-family shareholders (whose ability to realize capital gains by selling their ownership 
stake makes them more flexible regarding the way to achieve a return on their investment) 
prefer the opposite. Thereby, the fact that Germany underwent a major tax reform in 2001 
(“Gesetz zur Senkung der Steuersätze und zur Reform der Unternehmensbesteuerung”) allows 
us to show that this result does not depend on whether dividends are taxed under a full 
imputation system (before 2001) or a shareholder relief system (starting 2001). 
Our third contribution is related to the analysis of payout policy in Germany. Thereby, 
we complement the existing studies on dividend policy in Germany by Amihud and Murgia 
(1997), Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), Goergen et al. (2005) and Andres et al. (2008). Our 
study allows us to confirm recent international trends in payout policy for Germany (von Eije 
and Megginson (2008) and Denis and Osobov (2008); see DeAngelo et al. (2009) for a 
review). Overall (and independent of the ownership and board structure), we find that the 
fraction of dividend payers is declining heavily over the 1995 to 2006 period (from 78% to 
45%), although the aggregate level of dividends is even increasing. Hence, a small fraction of 
large, established and profitable non-financial firms accounts for the majority of dividend 
payments. While this trend is similar to U.S.-based and international evidence, we find that 
share repurchases have not as heavily gained in importance in Germany as in the U.S. This 
might be related to the legal restrictions in the use of share repurchases inherent in the 
German stock corporation act and less flexible opportunities to raise new capital via seasoned 
equity offerings with respect to mandatory rights issues and time-consuming approval by the 
shareholder meeting beforehand.  
Of course, our paper is related to the empirical work of Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) 
who already argue that corporate governance does matter for payout policy. In particular, they 
use panel data between 1992 and 1998 on 266 major German firms to show that the presence 
of a majority shareholder leads to lower payout ratios, at least if there is no second large 
shareholder that is able to monitor the majority shareholder. They interpret this finding in a 
way that dominant shareholders avoid “pro-rata distribution of earnings” via dividends and 
instead prefer to exploit minority shareholders via tunneling activities. Although we are able 
to confirm this result in general using a much broader dataset, we show that the identity of the 
dominant shareholder is of critical importance. While large external shareholders have a 
negative effect on payout propensity, the presence of family shareholders leads to a higher 
likelihood of a payout. This result suggests that in Germany family shareholders at large do   9
not exploit minority shareholders (agency conflict II between majority-minority 
shareholders). Our interpretation that founding families are a special type of controlling 
shareholders is consistent with earlier empirical evidence by Andres (2008) in the context of 
firm performance. In terms of methodology, our study complements the one by Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003) since they largely use stock prize reactions to dividend announcements (an 
event study methodology), while we exploit cross-sectional and time-series variance in the 
payout propensity and dividend level among different shareholder groups. 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 motivates our paper 
based on two ways: We start with a summary of recent empirical findings for payout policy in 
the U.S and other countries and continue with an explanation why family firms are especially 
adequate to analyze the influence of controlling shareholders on payout policy. Section 3 
explains the construction of our dataset while Section 4 presents our empirical results. Section 
5 shows several robustness tests. Finally, section 6 concludes and provides policy 
implications. 
 
2 Motivation and literature review 
 
2.1 Recent trends in U.S. payout policy 
 
Most published research on corporate payout policy has focused on the U.S. Although 
it is beyond the scope of this section to summarize this extensive and mature strand of 
literature,
6 we want to highlight the most recent trends in U.S. payout policy: First, Fama and 
French (2001) show that the number of firms paying cash dividends has declined heavily from 
66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. The authors argue that this development can in part be 
attributed to changing characteristics of publicly traded firms. In fact, the number of listed 
firms in the U.S. has grown rapidly during the 1990s with new lists that are smaller, less 
profitable and faster growing. In addition, their asset base is dominated by intangibles rather 
than fixed assets (Fama and French (2004)). However, Fama and French (2001) also show 
that the propensity to pay dividends has even declined after controlling for changing firm 
characteristics.  
Second, Fama and French’s (2001) striking finding might be related to changing 
patterns of corporate payout policy over the last decades: While the meaning of share 
repurchases as a payout policy instrument has increased, the importance of cash dividends has 
decreased. Skinner (2008) reports that the aggregate level of stock repurchases has now 
approximately the same magnitude as the aggregate amount of cash dividends.
7 Firms that 
only pay dividends are largely extinct. Instead, three groups of firms have emerged: (i) firms 
that pay dividends and make regular repurchases (ii) firms that make regular repurchases and 
(iii) firms that make occasional repurchases. Brav et al. (2005) provide survey evidence that 
group (i) consists of large, established firms that continue to pay cash dividends with regard to 
                                                 
6 For excellent reviews of the literature, see e.g. Allen and Michaely (2003) or DeAngelo et al. (2009). For a 
similar description of recent trends in corporate payout policy in the U.S., see von Eije and Megginson (2008). 
7 For further evidence that the level of stock repurchases has increased dramatically over the last decades and 
stock repurchases function at least partly as a substitution for cash dividends, cf. Grullon and Michaely (2002).    10
their history – most of those firms have paid dividends for years and are therefore obliged to 
continue this practice.  
Third, Weston and Sui (2003) show another trend: Overall, firms tend to distribute an 
increasing part of their earnings. In a first step, they analyze the corporate sector’s cash 
dividends as percentage of corporate earnings and find an increase of this ratio from 40% in 
1971 to 60% in 1990 and finally to even 81% in 2001. If they include both dividends and 
share repurchases in their analysis, the level of payout in relation to corporate earnings even 
reached 116% in 2001. Hence, in 2001 firms decided to pay out more than they earned.  
Fourth, the trend to increase the payout ratio is driven by just a minority of very 
profitable firms as indicated by DeAngelo et al. (2004). They find that “the 25 firms that paid 
the largest dividends in 2000 account for a majority of the aggregate dividends and earnings 
of industrial firms” (DeAngelo et al. (2004), p. 425). The substantial increase in payouts of 
mature firms more than substitutes the large number of small and medium-sized listed firms 
that refrains from paying dividends. In another article, DeAngelo et al. (2006) add one 
important piece to this puzzle by showing that dividend payment is related to the life-cycle of 
the firm. Mature firms with high retained earnings pay higher dividends than younger firms 
with a large portion of contributed equity (and a low portion of retained earnings) and better 
investment opportunities. 
  Fifth, there are some studies that analyze how different ownership categories affect 
payout policy (Lie and Lie (1999), Perez-Gonzalez (2002), Hsieh and Wang (2008) among 
others). In contrast to our paper, their motivation to use ownership data is to study tax 
clientele effects rather than corporate governance issues or inter- and intra-shareholder 
conflicts. Based on exogenous variation in personal income taxes, Perez-Gonzalez (2002) can 
show that tax preferences of large shareholders indeed matter for the choice between 
dividends and capital gains. In a similar vein, Lie and Lie (1999) and Hsieh and Wang (2008) 
argue that corporate insiders’ ownership stakes and tax preferences have an influence on the 
decision between dividends and share repurchases as the means of payout policy. The next 
section focuses on empirical evidence outside the U.S.  
 
2.2 What do we know about payout policy outside the U.S.? 
 
In comparison to the extensive empirical research on payout policy in the U.S., there is 
still comparatively little evidence on payout policy patterns in Europe. This is surprising since 
the “law and finance”-literature originating in the late 1990s suggests a strong link between 
legal origin, institutional setting and corporate policy choices (see for example LaPorta et al. 
(1997, 1998) for the beginning of this literature and LaPorta et al. (2008) for a comprehensive 
review).  
First, LaPorta et al. (2000b) indicate that dividend payments are increasing in investor 
protection and decreasing in agency costs. They use the cross-country heterogeneity in terms 
of agency costs associated with the institutional setting for an international study on dividend 
policy of more than 4,000 firms from 33 countries. They argue that agency costs can influence 
dividend decisions in two ways: minority shareholders might “pressure” corporate insiders to 
distribute cash (outcome model) or firms might pay dividends in order to favor future   11
investors in the event of seasoned equity issues (substitute model). They conclude that in line 
with the “outcome model of dividends” firms in countries with better investor protection pay 
higher dividends. Moreover, in such countries investors are willing to wait for their dividends 
along the life-cycle of firms as indicated by the fact that high growth firms pay lower 
dividends than low growth firms. However, the sole focus of LaPorta et al. (2000) lies on 
dividends.  
Second, two studies provide recent evidence on differences in payout policy 
throughout several developed economies and Europe: Denis and Osobov (2008) examine the 
likelihood to pay dividends in a set of seven developed economies between 1989 and 2002 (in 
particular they analyze the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, Germany, France and 
Japan). They find cross-country evidence for the Fama and French (2001) observation that the 
propensity to pay dividends is positively related to firm size and profitability but negatively to 
growth options. Moreover, they show that the earned/contributed capital mix has high 
explanatory power for dividend policy as proposed by DeAngelo et al. (2006). In 
contradiction to the U.S. evidence by Fama and French (2001), Denis and Obosov (2008) find 
no indication that dividend payments declined outside the U.S. In fact, the aggregate level of 
dividends is constant and concentrated among a number of large, profitable and established 
firms (which is largely in line with U.S. based evidence provided by DeAngelo et al. (2004) 
and the life-cycle theory of dividends suggested by DeAngelo et al. (2006)). To the extent that 
a dividend decline exists it is primarily driven by the failure of newly listed firms to pay 
dividends. Finally, in contrast to the U.S. the analysis cannot provide supporting evidence for 
catering explanations of dividends (see Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) for the catering 
explanation of dividend policy).  
Von Eije and Megginson (2008) analyze both dividends and share repurchases for 15 
countries within the European Union between 1989 and 2005. They provide a number of 
interesting findings: Although total real dividends paid have increased, the fraction of 
dividend payers has declined. While the overall propensity to pay dividends has declined, the 
propensity for share repurchases and the total value of share repurchases has increased. As in 
the U.S., common factors such as firm size, market-to-book or profitability seem to have high 
explanatory power for payout policy in Europe. Although fewer European firms than U.S. 
firms repurchase shares, there seems to be evidence for a complimentary effect of share 
repurchases for dividends. The former seem to be more sensitive to corporate earnings 
especially in the last years of the study period (2001-2005). In addition, von Eije and 
Megginson (2008) find a positive relationship between financial reporting frequency, which 
has increased from an average of 1.2 to 2.4 per year within the EU from 1989 to 2005, and the 
payout level. They also report that privatized firms are usually strong dividend payers. While 
they only account for 2% of the listed firms, they are responsible for almost one quarter of 
cash dividends. Interestingly, and in contrast to the findings of DeAngelo et al. (2006) for the 
U.S. and Denis and Osobov (2008) on an international dataset they find no significant 
relationship between the mix of retained/contributed capital and corporate payout policy. 
Third, with regard to Germany, the following empirical results are important: Von Eije 
and Megginson (2008) find a strong decline in the number of regular dividend payers, from 
84% of all listed firms in their dataset in 1991 to only 37% in 2004. They relate this finding to   12
the large number of entrepreneurial firms that went public during Germany’s boom phase at 
the high-tech segment Neuer Markt between 1998 and 2000. Concerning share repurchases, 
they document (without reporting concrete numbers) that they were almost non-existing in 
Germany before 1998 and were used in a comparatively moderate way after 1998. Goergen et 
al. (2005) provide large-scale empirical evidence that dividend policy in Germany is more 
flexible than in the U.S. Temporary dividend cuts and omissions – especially after the 
occurrence of a loss – seem to be a common feature. This result is in strong contrast to the 
predictions of Lintner (1956) and empirical evidence of DeAngelo et al. (1992) who report 
that U.S. firms reduce their dividend permanently if earnings deteriorate. In this context, 
Andres et al. (2008) argue that German firms use cash-flows instead of earnings to determine 
target dividends. Finally, Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) already argue that corporate governance 
is important for dividend policy in Germany. In particular, they show that controlling 
shareholders – if they are not monitored by a second large shareholder – are decreasing the 
“pro-rata payouts” through dividends and instead prefer to consume private benefits of 
control. Overall, empirical evidence on payout policy outside the U.S. is still comparatively 
scarce. The same is true for empirical studies dealing with the influence of controlling 
shareholders on payout policy. In this sense, founding families are typical controlling 
shareholders with distinct characteristics (Villalonga and Amit (2009b)) that differentiate 
them from other types of large shareholders. The next section summarizes our predictions 
concerning their behavior. 
 
2.3 Family firms in the context of payout policy decisions 
 
We explore two hypotheses in the context of payout policy in family firms. The first 
one is related to agency costs. Rozeff (1982), Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) argue 
that dividend payments have a disciplinary character. According to Jensen’s (1986) Free-
Cash-Flow Hypothesis managers can use substantial free cash flow for dividends or share 
repurchases instead of investing in low return projects or even waste the money otherwise 
(Jensen (1986)). If the manager wants to finance further projects despite the distribution of 
dividends, he is forced to issue new external capital. As a consequence, external capital 
providers are available for monitoring activities and the reduction of information asymmetries 
(Easterbrook (1984)).  
However, to put the Free-Cash-Flow Hypothesis in the context of family firms, one 
has to consider that family firms differ from widely-held firms in several important aspects. In 
terms of monitoring the firm’s management, founding families are large shareholders that can 
overcome the free-rider problem commonly associated with atomistic shareholder structures 
of widely-held firms (Grossmann and Hart (1980), Shleifer and Vishny (1986)). Their 
monitoring efforts alleviate the classical shareholder-manager conflict in widely-held firms. In 
contrast to other controlling shareholders which have similar incentives to monitor 
management, the founding family members regularly participate in the firm’s top 
management. Under such circumstances the agency conflict between management and 
shareholders is further decreased or even non-existing. Family representation in the 
management or supervisory board leads to a convergence-of-interest-effect between the   13
founding family and outside shareholders. Consequently, we expect agency costs to be 
significantly lower in family firms, especially in those family firms with family management. 
The disciplining role of dividends seems to become less important. Hence, we expect family 
firms to have a lower propensity to pay dividends and lower payout ratios. We state this as the 
agency cost hypothesis of family management.  
  Founding families typically show long-term commitment (often spanning more than 
one generation), provide “patient capital” and even intend to bequeath the family firm to 
future generation (James (1999), Casson (1999) and Chami (1999)).
8 Moreover, they usually 
dedicate a significant part of their personal wealth to the family firm and can therefore be 
considered as undiversified, large shareholders.
9 Both aspects taken together create a strong 
incentive for the founding family to retain control over the firm and hence make a sale of 
shares accompanied by a loss of voting rights unlikely. At the same time the members of the 
founding family might not want to abstain from generating a steady income in order to fund 
personal consumption. Therefore, we expect a strong desire for dividends caused by family 
ownership. We pose this as the income and control hypothesis of family ownership. 
 
3 Dataset, institutional setting and variables 
 
3.1 Data and sample 
 
One reason why research on the impact of controlling shareholders on corporate 
decision making outside the U.S. is scarce is that information on ownership and board 
structures is not systematically available in any database. As a consequence, we use hand-
collected information on company founders, ownership and board structures of German 
CDAX firms. Overall, our panel dataset covers 660 non-financial firms from Germany over 
the period 1995-2006.
10  
The core of our data comes from Hoppenstedt Aktienführer.  Hoppenstedt collects 
annual data on ownership structures, management and supervisory board composition of all 
publicly listed German firms. In order to verify the ownership information from our primary 
source, we have further used the following data sources: Bureau van Dijk’s Amadeus 
database, Commerzbank’s Wer gehört zu wem and the director dealings’ database from the 
Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin). We start our analysis in 1995 since reliable 
information on ownership structures are rarely available for German firms beforehand. 
Starting in 1995, according to the German Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) 
                                                 
8 Klasa (2007) identifies during the 1984-1998 period only 84 transactions in the large U.S. capital market where 
controlling families sell their ownership stake via a block trade. Within the three Continental European countries 
France, Germany and Italy Franks et al. (2009) show that family ownership is enduring over the 1996 to 2006 
period. Altogether, both empirical studies underline the long-term character of family firm investments.  
9 In fact, Anderson et al. (2003) report that based on information from the Forbes’ Wealthiest Americans data, 
families have on average 69% of their wealth tied to the firm. Holmen et al. (2007) find similar results for 
Sweden. In their study of listed Swedish firms during 1988 and 1991, they have detailed data on the portfolio 
diversification of Swedish shareholders. Swedish families invest on average 50% of their personal wealth in their 
firms. They show that the invested wealth is between 0.4% (minimum) and 147% (maximum), i.e. some families 
even borrow to invest in their firms. Cf. Holmen et al. (2007).  
10 Following several other studies, we have decided to exclude 153 financial firms (based on the primary two-
digit SIC-Codes 60-65 and 67) from our sample due to their balance sheet specifics.    14
firms have to report large shareholders with voting rights (of at least 5%) to both the Federal 
Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin) and the traded company itself.
11 Our sample period 
ends in 2006 which is the most recent year with available data on ownership and board 
structures when collecting the dataset.  
To collect information on company founders we rely primarily on the firm’s history 
section from Hoovers Online Database. However, we supplement missing information with 
press research from Factiva and LexisNexis. Despite intensive research, we are not able to 
obtain this information for 26 firms (or less than 4% of all non-financial CDAX-firms), which 
are excluded from our sample.  
Finally, we merge our hand-collected information on company founders, ownership 
and board composition with accounting and capital market data from the Thomson Financials 
Worldscope and Datastream databases. Information about share repurchases is 
complemented from annual reports. Our final sample covers 660 non-financial firms (5,135 
firm years).
12 It contains a wide variety of firms: First, it includes world-renown, large and 
well-established firms with a long firm history mostly operating in traditional manufacturing 
industries, such as Siemens, Bayerische Motoren Werke or Thyssen-Krupp. Second, there are 
companies that emerged during Germany’s post-war economic miracle, such as the publishing 
house Axel Springer or the former state-owned airline Lufthansa. Finally, the sample covers 
also successful new-economy start-ups from high-tech industries, such as internet, biotech or 
solar-energy. 
 
3.2 The institutional setting in Germany 
 
In Germany, the payout policy is determined in the following way: The management 
board announces a proposal for the distribution of net income (including dividends and share 
repurchases), which has to be presented to the supervisory board and approved by the annual 
shareholder meeting (§§ 170 and 174 AktG). Although formally a simple majority of voting 
rights is necessary, the de facto majority is even below 50% considering the traditionally 
comparative low representation of voting capital at annual shareholder meetings in Germany 
indicated by previous case study research (e.g. Baums and Fraune (1995)). This procedure 
underlines our argument that controlling shareholders have considerable power and discretion 
in determining the firm’s payout policy. Hence, in our analysis we focus on voting rights 
(instead of cash-flow rights) of the most influential shareholders. Thereby, a controlling 
shareholder according to our definition holds at least 25% of voting rights while a second 
largest shareholder holds at least 5% of voting rights. In the spirit of Gugler and Yurtoglu 
(2003) this allows us to analyze how the firm’s control structure influences payout policy. 
                                                 
11 In January 2007 the European Union’s Transparency Directive 2004/109/EG was implemented with the 
Transparenzrichtlinien-Umsetzungsgesetz (TUG), which has further reduced the mandatory reporting limit to 3% 
of voting rights according to §21 WpHG. Currently, the thresholds for shareholders’ mandatory reporting 
according to the WpHG are 3%, 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, 25%, 30%, 50% and 75% of voting rights. In case of 
bypassing any of these thresholds shareholders have to report their voting rights to both the listed company and 
the Federal Financial Supervisory Authority (BaFin).   
12 Although we have complete ownership and board data for 5,135 firm-year observations, we cannot use all 
observations in our regressions (section 4) due to incomplete or missing accounting data from Worldscope.     15
However, dividends are distributed on a pro-rata basis to the shareholders’ cash-flow rights. 
Whenever there is a deviation from the one share-one vote principle, shareholders might have 
strong incentives to seek other forms of compensation not based on a “pro-rata” income 
distribution. Since German ownership structures are historically frequently characterized by 
pyramids, cross-holdings and dual-class shares (Köke (2001)), we consequently integrate a 
dummy variable into our analysis indicating whether there is a wedge between control and 
cash-flow rights.
13 
Besides this general decision making process there are some limitations to the 
shareholders’ discretion over the payout policy: First, the annual net income – which is the 
basis for any profit distribution decision by the annual shareholder meeting – is under 
substantial managerial discretion due to earnings management practices. This is especially 
important if financial statements are prepared under Germany’s conservative accounting 
system (cf. Harris et al. 1994 for an overview of German GAAP, so called 
Handelsgesetzbuch). The principle of prudence encourages conservative asset valuation. For 
example, the imparity principle suggests to record unrealized losses but not unrealized gains. 
Moreover, management may have incentives to reduce reported earnings in order to avoid 
shareholder pressure for higher payouts.  
However, please consider that our sample period from 1995 through 2006 is 
characterized by a huge heterogeneity in terms of applied accounting standards. This is again 
related to changes in the legal environment: Since 1998, according to the capital raising 
facilitating act (Kapitalaufnahmeerleichterungsgesetz, KapAEG), all listed German 
consolidated companies have the possibility to prepare annual consolidated financial 
statements in IFRS/IAS or US-GAAP. Simultaneously they face no necessity to prepare 
additional annual consolidated (not individual) financial statement in German GAAP if they 
apply IFRS or US-GAAP. From 2005 onwards, the usage of IFRS is mandatory for 
consolidated companies according to § 315a German GAAP.
14 To control for this 
heterogeneity, we use a dummy variable that takes unit value one if German GAAP was used 
in the respective firm-year observation. 
Second, management and supervisory board jointly can decide to retain up to 50% of 
the annual net income without consulting the shareholders. In addition, the articles of 
association can even further allow for an increase of this legally determined 50%-proportion 
as long as the balance sheet position “other retained earnings” is less than half of the firm’s 
equity (§ 58 II AktG). Hence, the decision about corporate payout policy is influenced by 
                                                 
13 We suspect that deviations from the one share-one vote principle have been mitigated during the last decade, 
with respect to the following legal reforms: The act on control and transparency of corporations in 1998 (Gesetz 
zur Kontrolle und Transparenz im Unternehmensbereich, KontraG) has abandoned the legality of multiple voting 
shares. Moreover the issuance of (non-voting) preferred shares is limited to at most 50% of the ordinary share 
capital according to § 139 stock corporation act. However, the policy to issue preferred shares has declined 
heavily among newly listed firms over the last decade. Hence, the phenomenon of preferred shares does only 
occur in 284 firm-year observations (6% of all firm-year observations) in our sample. Finally, with the tax 
reform in 2002 capital gains tax has no longer been incurred on divestitures of equity ownership stakes at the 
corporate level. This reform intends to reduce cross-holdings and the financial institutions’ common equity 
holdings of industrial firms (Goergen et al. 2008b).  
14 According to Günther et al. (2009) there are 255 voluntary adopters and 152 mandatory adopters of IFRS in 
their sample of German CDAX-firms between 1995 and 2005. 
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several corporate governance institutions: management board, supervisory board and the 
annual shareholder meeting. 
Third, there are strong legal limitations in the use of share repurchases as payout 
policy instrument. Share repurchases have only been possible under special circumstances (§ 
71 AktG) in Germany before 1998, for example in order to offer repurchased stock to 
employees or to avoid any serious damage to the company. This strong legal restriction was 
abandoned in 1998 with the law on transparency and control in the corporate sector. It has 
enabled listed firms to buy back its own shares up to a limit of 10% of outstanding ordinary 
share capital. Hence, share repurchases in Germany have rarely occurred before 1998 and are 
still treated restrictively in comparison to other countries. Besides the legal restrictions, there 
are some other obstacles to share repurchases that have to be considered, at least if compared 
to other countries with more developed capital markets. In Germany, seasoned equity 
offerings require time-consuming shareholder meetings’ approval and mandatory rights 
issues. Hence, beyond the legal restrictions the difficulties to issue new equity might make 
management more reluctant to buy back shares in Germany if compared for example to 
Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Fourth, several studies argue that shareholders’ tax considerations influence corporate 
payout decisions (among others Lie and Lie (1999), Perez-Gonzalez (2002), Hsieh and Wang 
(2008), Barclay et al. (forthcoming)). Against this background, Germany is an interesting case 
since it underwent a major amendment of its tax code in 2000. The new tax code became 
effective in 2001 and changed the tax system with regard to equity income from a full 
imputation system to a shareholder relief system. To consider this regulatory change, we 
calculate zero distribution profits as basis for our payout ratio and test for the impact of tax 
effects for family owners in our robustness section. In principal, equity income in Germany is 
subject to corporate and personal taxes. Before 2001, Germany is characterized by an 
imputation system for the taxation of dividends (Vollanrechnungsverfahren). According to 
this system, retained earnings were taxed at a higher rate than earnings distributed as 
dividends at the corporate level. Hence, corporate tax liabilities are subject to dividend 
distributions.  
Following previous work on dividend policy in Germany (Goergen et al. (2005), 
Andres et al. (2008)), we use “zero distribution profits” to calculate a payout ratio. “Zero 













where td stands for the tax rate on dividend distributed, tc stands for the tax rate on retained 
earnings, D(1-tc) are the dividends after corporate tax, D/(1-td) are the dividends gross of tax 
distributions and R are retained earnings (after corporate tax). To understand how the tax 
system affects the dividend policy in Germany, suppose the firm incurs a loss. If the firm 
decides to omit the dividend, there will be no tax liability. If the firm decides to pay out a 
dividend despite the loss, there will be a tax liability (which is td times the dividend 
distributed). Under the imputation system, shareholders were able to credit corporate tax   17
payments against their dividend tax liabilities. At the end, gross dividends were taxed at the 
personal tax rate.  
After the tax reform in 2001 (Gesetz zur Senkung der Steuersätze und zur Reform der 
Unternehmensbesteuerung) the taxation system in Germany changed from a full imputation 
system to a shareholder relief system.
15 Under this new system, retained and distributed 
earnings are no longer taxed at different rates. Capital gains of individual investors were in 
general tax-exempt if (i) shares were held more than one year and (ii) the shareholder is not a 
qualified shareholder, i.e. he owned less than 1% in the firm during the last five years.
16 
However, since founding-families (and other controlling shareholders) are usually large, 
qualified shareholders the tax-exemption of capital gains does not apply to them. Hence, all 
equity income generated by family shareholders (dividends and capital gains) under the 
shareholder relief system were taxed at half of the personal tax rate starting in 2002 
(Halbeinkünfteverfahren).
17 Hence, assuming the marginal tax rate a family shareholder had 
to pay is between 0.21 Euro (in 2005) and 0.235 Euro (in 2002) taxes for one Euro dividend 
and capital gain after the tax reform.  
Overall, before 2001 family shareholders should have preferred capital gains over 
dividends if they simply want to maximize their private wealth. However, if they wanted to 
realize capital gains (and generate income), they were forced to sell shares and hence dilute 
their ownership stake. Taking these control considerations into account, the only alternative 
for family shareholder to generate a steady income without decreasing their ownership stake, 
are dividends (which incurred higher corporate taxes before 2001). After the tax reform, 
family shareholders are expected to be indifferent concerning the payout vehicle from a tax 
point of view.
18 Eggert and Weichenrieder (2002) argue that in general the 2001 tax reform 
does not change any priority of financing policy from a tax point of view. They further 
demonstrate that for major shareholders beyond the 1%-stake it is more advantageous to 
retain earnings for dividend distribution and simultaneously raise new equity to finance 
internal NPV-positive investment projects (“Schütt-aus-hol-zurück-Politik”). However, such a 
policy is not attractive for family shareholders to generate income, since they either have to 
fear a loss of control with the new equity issue or receive no income if they use the payout to 
participate in the new equity issue. Hence, we argue that the tax reform should not affect 
family shareholders preferences for either dividends or share repurchases. Furthermore, 
survey evidence by Pellens and Schremper (2000) among top executives suggests that tax 
                                                 
15 This change from an imputation to a shareholder relief taxation system is related to the fact that under the full 
imputation system domestic and foreign shareholders have been treated differently. Using the corporate tax as an 
imputation for the personal tax liability was only possible for dividends paid by domestic companies to domestic 
shareholders. An important decision by the European court of justice (ECJ of 9.7.2006, C 319-02 (Manninen)) 
confirmed that such a differential taxation depending on the national status of the company and the taxpayer is 
contrary to European law and the principle of free-capital movement. As a consequence, full imputation systems 
have been abolished in several European countries.        
16 See for the speculative period of one year § 22 II in connection with § 23 I (1) Nr. 1 EstG and for the 1%-tax 
threshold § 17 I EstG. The tax-exempt threshold was 25% before 1999 and 10% in 1999 and 2000. From 2001 
on it was 1% 
17 See for the taxation of dividends § 3 Nr. 40 EstG and for the taxation of capital gains § 17 I EstG. Eggert and 
Weichenrieder (2002) provide a similar description of the tax code reform in Germany. 
18 Of course, there is one advantage of share repurchases that is independent of tax treatment. Investors can 
decide upon when to realize capital gains. Hence, in contrast to tax payments on dividends, tax payments on 
capital gains can be postponed.   18
arguments are not imperative for payout policy decisions in German listed firms. 
Nevertheless, we control for such tax effects by including (i) year dummies in our regressions 
and (ii) dividing our sample into two time periods from 1995 to 2000 (before the tax reform) 
and from 2001 to 2006 (after the tax reform). We can show that our results remain unchanged 
during both sub-periods and are therefore robust to the changes in taxation.
19 
 
3.3 Family firm variables 
 
We identify family firms based on the founding family’s involvement in the firm’s 
governance structure. In particular, we focus on the following two components: family 
ownership and family management. A sample firm qualifies as a family firm if (i) the 
founding family has at least 25% of voting rights or (ii) the founding family has at least 5% of 
voting rights and a member of the founding family is present in the management board and/or 
in the supervisory board. If more than one member of the founding family is invested we 
calculate the cumulated ownership fraction of the founding family. Similarly, if a firm has 
more than one founder we consider the accumulated ownership fraction of all founding 
families. This definition is more restrictive than the existing body of literature on listed family 
firms (for example, see Anderson and Reeb (2003a, 2003b), Villalonga and Amit (2006) for 
the U.S., Sraer and Thesmar (2007) for France and Andres (2007, 2008) or Ampenberger et 
al. (2009) for Germany).   
Our definition requires a strong influence of the founding family on the family firm’s 
decision making process: With regard to the more concentrated ownership structures in 
Continental Europe (in comparison to the U.S and U.K, see LaPorta et al. (1999) or Barca and 
Becht (2002) among others), we require that family shareholders have at least 25% of voting 
rights, which is also an important control threshold according to the German stock corporation 
act.
20 In contrast to previous studies about listed family firms in Germany (Andres (2007, 
2008) or Ampenberger et al. (2009)), we further require a minimum ownership threshold of 
5% even if the founding family is active in firm management. Since the desire to receive 
corporate payout depends largely on the family’s cash-flow rights (and the power to exert 
influence via voting rights) this minimum ownership threshold seems to be justified in the 
context of corporate payout policy. Based on this rather restrictive definition we have created 
a dummy variable called family firm which is one if the firm qualifies as a family business 
and zero otherwise.  
In a next step, we calculate a number of additional variables to measure the influence 
of family ownership vs. family management, within-family conflicts and tensions of family 
shareholders with non-family shareholders. The variables are constructed in the following 
way: First, we construct a dummy variable for family ownership that equals 1 if the founding 
family holds at least 25% of the firm’s equity and zero otherwise. Straightforward, the 
dummy variable for family management equals 1 if a member of the founding family is 
                                                 
19 In general, see Goergen et al. (2005) or Andres et al. (2008) for a similar description of the institutional 
environment for payout policy in Germany. 
20 Several other studies about family firms in Europe have adjusted the ownership thresholds in their family firm 
definition to the more concentrated ownership structures in Europe in a similar way. Among others cf. Andres 
(2007, 2008), Sraer and Thesmar (2007) or Ampenberger et al. (2009).   19
present in the management or supervisory board. Second, we also construct a floating variable 
for family ownership that is simply the percentage ownership of the family (voting rights). 
Furthermore, we want to measure conflicts within the founding family on the one hand and 
tensions between family shareholders and non-family shareholders on the other hand. Third, 
to measure tensions within the founding family we split the universe of family firms into two 
sub-groups: Founder-controlled firms and real family firms. Thereby, we follow Miller et al. 
(2007) in terms of methodology, but adopt their definitions to account for the more 
concentrated ownership structures in Germany. A real family firm is a firm in which family 
members beyond the founder hold a significant ownership stake. Thereby, we require that 
non-founder family members have a substantial ownership stake of at least 25% or they are 
involved in either the firm’s management and/or supervisory board and hold at least 5% of 
voting rights. In contrast, founder-controlled firms are all other family firms which do not 
fulfill the criteria of a real family firm. They are almost exclusively dominated by the founder 
as the following ownership information illustrates: The average ownership of the founder in 
founder-controlled firms is 35.6%, whereas it is only 2.6% in real family firms. Non-founder 
family members hold on average 52.5% of the voting rights in real family firms. In contrast, 
they own on average less than 4% in founder-controlled firms. If tensions between family 
members lead to a stronger desire for corporate payouts as suggested by the Economist 
statement in our introduction, we expect the propensity for payout and the payout level to be 
higher in real family firms than in founder-controlled firms. Fourth, regarding the conflicts 
with outside shareholders we calculate the voting rights of the founding family relative to the 
voting rights of other large, non-family shareholders (with voting-rights of at least 5%). 
Following the income and control hypothesis of family ownership we expect payouts to be 
particularly high if the founding family has considerable voting power relative to other 
shareholders. A detailed overview of the variables can be found in table 2.  
 
3.4 Measurement of payout and repurchase decisions 
 
In a first step we want to analyze the propensity to pay out dividends or buy back 
shares. For that reason we calculate several measures: (i) First, we apply a dummy variable 
for dividend payment which equals 1 if the firm pays any dividend to common and preferred 
equity in year t (DIVIDEND). (ii) Second, we calculate a dummy variable for share 
repurchases (REPURCHASE). The variable equals 1 if the company buys back shares in year 
t and zero otherwise
21 (iii) Third, since we consider dividend payments and share repurchases 
to be substitutes for payout to shareholders, we additionally use a dummy variable for the 
total payout propensity that is 1 if the firm either pays dividends or repurchases shares 
(PAYOUT). 
In a second step, we analyze the level of payout with regard to dividends and share 
repurchases. The measures applied are: (i) First, the dividend-payout-ratio is calculated by the 
total amount of common and preferred dividends divided by zero distribution profits 
                                                 
21 Hereby, we use the Worldscope item for repurchases of outstanding shares (wc04751). However, the data 
coverage of this item is rather poor for our sample (about 55%). Hence, we use firms’ annual reports if they are 
available to complement the Worldscope data on share repurchases. Altogether there are 335 share repurchasing 
events from Worldscope and 54 share repurchasing events taken from annual reports.   20
(DIVIDEND-TO-EARNINGS). However, we adopt the dividend-to-earnings ratio as 
suggested by Julio and Ikenberry (2004) and von Eije et al. (2008): We set the dividend-to-
earnings ratio to 1 if it is negative (because of negative income) or above one. (ii) Second, the 
share repurchases-payout ratio is calculated by the repurchasing volume divided by zero 
distribution profits. (iii) Third, we calculate a total payout ratio based on the combined 
dividend and share repurchase volume relative to zero-distribution profits. (iv) Fourth, as 
robustness tests, we perform two other specifications: We calculate both payout ratios with 
net income available to common (instead of using zero distribution profits) since this is more 
common in International empirical studies. However, as indicated in the robustness tests, this 
does not change our results. In addition, we use cash-flows (calculated as zero distribution 
profits plus depreciation and changes in pension provisions) as denominator in our payout 
ratios. This is related to the reasoning of Andres et al. (2008) that German firms determine 
their dividend payments based on cash-flows rather than earnings. Again, as indicated in our 
robustness section, our results remain qualitatively unchanged. 
 
3.5 Definition of control variables 
 
In our analysis, we use the following set of control variables (for a detailed overview 
of all variables applied in the regressions cf. table 2).  
Decisions about payout policy are dependent on the firm’s governance structure. In 
particular, the payout policy decisions might not only be influenced by family shareholders 
but also by other controlling shareholders (Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003)). Hence, we include a 
dummy variable (OUTSIDE BLOCKHOLDER) which equals one if there is an outside 
blockholder with an ownership stake of at least 25% and zero otherwise. Moreover, deviations 
from the one-share-one-vote-principle can impact payout decisions. Hence, we include a 
dummy variable that is one if there is a divergence between cash-flow and voting rights of the 
largest shareholder with respect tp pyramidal ownership or if the firm uses dual-class shares 
(DIVERGENCE CASH-FLOW RIGHTS). 
As shown by Fama and French (2001), large and profitable companies are more likely 
to pay dividends. Hence, we include firm size, measured by the natural logarithm of total 
assets, as control variable in all of our regressions (FIRM SIZE). In addition, we control for 
profitability in all regressions regarding the payout propensity. We measure the level of 
profitability with the zero distribution profits scaled by totals assets (PROFITABILITY). Of 
course, we expect both firm size and profitability to be positively correlated with the analyzed 
payout variables. 
Following the Free-Cash-Flow-theory of Jensen (1986), leverage and dividends are 
substitutes in disciplining management. From this perspective, we include the leverage ratio 
as an alternative mechanism to reduce agency costs of free cash flow. Firms with high 
leverage ratios are expected to face lower agency problems because they pay higher interest 
rates on their loans and hence have less free cashflow. In addition, creditors may prevent these 
firms to transfer wealth to their shareholders, either with dividend payments or share 
repurchases. We measure leverage as the firm’s total liabilities divided by the sum of the   21
firm’s book value of equity plus total liabilities (LEVERAGE). Consequently, we expect a 
negative relationship between the leverage ratio and payout variables.  
One potential concern is that founding family ownership is not randomly assigned to 
industries with different risk profiles (Villalonga and Amit (2009b)). Consequently, we 
include a measure of firm-specific risk (FIRM SPECIFIC RISK). Firm-specific risk captures 
the part of stock prize volatility that is unique to an individual firm and thus related to specific 
operations. It is calculated as the residuals’ sum of squares (SSE) from a regression of the 
individual stock returns on the returns of the market (CDAX) over the preceding calendar 
year based on stock prizes from calendar year end.
22  
Firm age (FIRM AGE) is the natural logarithm of the number of years since the firms’ 
incorporation. It is calculated as the current sample year minus the year of the firm’s 
incorporation. Following Fama and French (2004), we expect younger firms ceteris paribus to 
have better internal growth options than older firms. By contrast, we expect mature firms to 
be more likely to distribute a larger share of their corporate earnings to shareholders. Hence, 
the expected relationship between firm age and dividend payment is positive. 
Furthermore, we control for the firm’s growth opportunities by including the market-
to-book ratio (MARKET-TO-BOOK) into our regressions. Firms with good investment 
options may prefer to retain earnings instead of distributing them. Hence, we expect market-
to-book ratio to be negatively related to payout decisions.
23  
The payout decisions of firms may be influenced by the behavior of other companies 
in their industry. Recent survey evidence on this topic is, for example, provided by Brav et al. 
(2005). Hence, we include the industry’s mean propensity to pay a dividend (mean industry 
dividend payout ratio) in all regressions to control for industry payout effects. Similarly, we 
include a measure for the industry’s mean share repurchase and total payout propensity and 
level in all regressions. Thereby, the firm’s industry is measured by the first digit of its 
primary SIC Code. Of course, we expect a positive relationship between the firm’s payout 
decisions and the behavior of its industry peers. 
Finally, as already described in the section about the institutional environment the 
applied accounting system might have a major impact on corporate earnings. The period of 
our analysis is characterized by a huge heterogeneity in terms of applied accounting 
standards, in particular the conservative accounting system German GAAP (HGB) vs. true-
and-fair-view accounting systems (IFRS/IAS, US-GAAP). To control for this aspect we 
include a dummy variable for the application of HGB (HGB ACCOUNTING DUMMY). 
To control for industry peculiarities, we further include industry dummies based on 
one-digit SIC codes. Payout policy decisions might be subject to macroeconomic and legal 
conditions as well. For example, a change in taxation of dividends – which has occurred in 
2001 – might have a direct influence on the payout policy decisions. To control for such time 
effects we include year dummies in our analysis.  
                                                 
22 One might argue that a measure of total risk (market risk plus firm-specific risk) is more suitable than firm-
specific risk in our context. However, we have used total risk as an alternative control variable in our analysis. 
Results remain unchanged and are therefore robust to the usage of total risk as an alternative measure of firm 
risk.  
23 For further empirical evidence that firm size, profitability and investment opportunities are influential to 
dividend policy in the suggested direction see for example Fama and French (2001).    22
4 Empirical results 
 
4.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
Ownership of German corporations 
 
Our dataset covers 660 listed non-financial firms in the 1995 to 2006 period. Table 1 
provides a comprehensive overview of the sample composition over time. In 1995, there are 
230 firms in our sample, 55 family firms (24%) and 175 non-family firms (76%). The 55 
family firms can be further divided in 12 founder-controlled firms and 43 real family firms. 
With regard to the exceptional large number of IPOs during the 1998 to 2000 period 
(particularly at the technology stock exchange “Neuer Markt”), the sample composition 
changes substantially over time. In 2006, we have 494 firms in our dataset, 184 family firms 
(37%) and 310 non-family firms (63%). In particular, the number of founder-controlled firms 
has significantly increased. While there are 128 founder-controlled firms in 2006, there are 56 
real family firms (cf. table 1 for a detailed overview about the sample composition). Within 
the family firms, the founding family plays an important role: Family members hold on 
average about 45% of the firm’s voting rights.  
In general, German ownership structures are very concentrated: In about 70% of all 
firm-year observations we observe one large, controlling shareholder with at least 25% of 
voting rights. In about 30% of all firm-year observations, this controlling shareholder is the 
founding family, but other types of controlling (non-family) shareholders are also common: 
Strategic blockholders (other companies) account for about 24% of firm-year observations, 
financial blockholders (banks, insurances, mutual funds, venture capital or private equity 
firms) for about 10%, individual blockholders (wealthy outside individuals) for about 4% and 
government blockholders (all public authorities) for about 2% of firm-year observations. Of 
course, in the remaining 30% of firm-year observations there is no controlling shareholder 
with at least 25% of voting rights.   
If there are controlling shareholders, their average ownership stake measured in voting 
rights is substantial: Strategic blockholders hold on average 69% of voting rights, financial 
blockholders 47%, individual blockholders 54% and government blockholders 49%. In about 
40% of all firm year observations the controlling shareholder is “uncontrolled” in a sense that 
there is no second large shareholder with voting rights of at least 5%. However, in 30% of all 
firm-year observations the controlling shareholder is “controlled” in the sense that there is 
such a second shareholder with at least 5% of voting rights. These figures underline our claim 
that Germany provides an ideal economic setting to analyze corporate payout policy from a 
corporate governance perspective. In particular, we use this unique heterogeneity in terms of 
shareholder dominance and identity to explore the controlling shareholders’ influence on 
payout policy choices. Thereby, a special focus lies on founding families as they are regarded 
to be a distinct type of controlling shareholders (Villalonga and Amit (2009b)). 
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Payout Policy in family and non-family firms 
 
A descriptive analysis of payout policy decisions between family firms and non-family 
firms leads to the following results: At first glance (and only in this univariate, descriptive 
analysis), family firms have a lower propensity for dividend payments (and total payouts). 
While the propensity for dividend payments (total payouts) is 43% (57%) in family firms it is 
56% (66%) in non-family firms. Regarding the payout ratio, family firms have also lower 
ratios regarding dividend payments (total dividends to common and preferred shareholders as 
percentage of zero distribution profits) and total payouts (total payouts as percentage of zero 
distribution profits) if compared to non-family firms. A t-test for differences in means 
indicates that the results are statistically significant at the 1%-level. Regarding share 
repurchases, family firms have a higher propensity to buy back own shares. However, there 
are two important limitations with this univariate analysis. First, it neglects that there are 
significant differences between family and non-family firms regarding several firm-specific 
characteristics, such as for example firm size and the stage within the firm’s life cycle. Family 
firms are significantly smaller (in terms of assets, sales and employees) and younger (in terms 
of firm age and IPO age) than non-family firms (cf. table 3). Second, it seems to be important 
whether the family firm is dominated by the founder (founder-controlled firms) or influenced 
by more than one family member (real family firm). While the former have a significantly 
lower payout propensity and level if compared to non-family firms, the latter have equal or 
even higher payout propensities and levels (cf. table 4). We account for both aspects (firm-
specific characteristics and differences between different types of family firms) in our 
multivariate analysis, but we first continue with a more general analysis of time trends in 
payout policy in Germany over the last years.  
 
4.2 Payout policy in Germany – time trends 
 
We start our empirical analysis by documenting recent trends in the payout policy of 
German non-financial firms. Figure 1 shows the percentage of companies that pay dividends 
and buy back shares during the years 1995 to 2006. The fraction of dividend-paying firms 
declines heavily until 2004 and starts to slightly recover again during the last two years of our 
sample period. Overall, the percentage of dividend payers fell from nearly 80% in 1995 to 
40% in 2004. Our results concerning this phenomenon are in line with previous results from a 
cross-European study by von Eije and Megginson (2008) who document that the decline in 
industrial dividend paying firms is a phenomenon independent of geographical region within 
the EU15. However, the extent of the decline varies across countries with Germany and the 
United Kingdom being especially prominent examples. For the decline of dividend paying 
firms, von Eije and Megginson (2008) find a magnitude comparable to our study, from a 
fraction of 84% dividend payers in 1991 to 37% in 2004.  
 
– Insert figure 1 about here – 
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In a second step, we analyze the mean dividend-to-earnings ratio calculated over all 
firms that are in our sample, not only over dividend payers. We find a very similar time trend 
(see figure 2). The mean dividend-to-earnings ratio declines from 56% in 1995 to 18% in 
2005. In 2006, the mean dividend-to-earnings ratio starts to slightly increase again to 22%.  
 
– Insert figure 2 about here – 
 
However, if we investigate the mean dividend-to-earnings ratio of dividend paying 
firms, we find that there is no visible time trend (see figure 3). Instead, the dividend-to-
earnings ratio was rather randomly fluctuating between 40% and 70%. One possible 
explanation for that issue is that profits of dividend paying firms grew with approximately the 
same rate as their absolute dividends, leading to roughly constant dividend-to-earnings ratios. 
 
– Insert figure 3 about here – 
 
Several U.S. based studies (e.g. Grullon and Michaely (2002) or Skinner (2008)) and 
survey evidence among financial executives in the U.S. provided by Brav et al. (2005) 
suggests that manager prefer share repurchases over dividends as the more flexible instrument 
to distribute earnings and excess cash to investors. However, as already pointed out in the 
description of the institutional environment, there have been and still are some legal obstacles 
to fully utilize share repurchases as the major payout policy instrument in Germany. In figure 
1, the percentage of share repurchasing firms is displayed. Before 1998, share repurchases 
were only allowed in Germany under special circumstances defined in the German stock 
corporation act. Consequently, as expected the fraction of share repurchasing firms is fairly 
low in Germany before 1998. With the introduction of the law on transparency and control in 
the corporate sector, share repurchases became legal, at least to a certain degree. Hence, the 
percentage of companies repurchasing shares increases after 1998. In 2000 and 2006 (the two 
years with the highest fraction of share repurchasing firms), about 16% of all sample firms 
use share repurchases as a payout vehicle. However, overall the importance of share 
repurchases in Germany is rather limited. For example, about 55% (49%) of all firms pay 
dividends in 2000 (2006).. In terms of overall payout volume over the 1995 to 2006 period, 
share repurchases account for a maximum of 9% of all payouts in the year 2000 (cf. figure 4 
that shows the volume of share repurchases relative to total payout). Hence, dividends are by 
far the most common way for German firms to distribute their earnings to shareholders. This 
is in strong contrast to the empirical evidence for the U.S. capital market. Skinner (2008) 
documents that share repurchases are an economically relevant phenomenon since the early 
1980s in the U.S. and have nowadays reached the same magnitude as aggregate dividends. 
While von Eije and Megginson (2008) do not report any number on the fraction of share 
repurchasing firms in Germany, they show that share repurchases have gained importance in 
the EU15-countries although to a lesser extent than in the U.S. In line with our more detailed 
analysis, von Eije and Megginson (2008) show that the aggregate level of share repurchases in 
Germany has grown modestly since 1998. 
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– Insert figure 4 about here – 
 
Figure 5 shows the percentage of firms that (i) use dividends and repurchase shares as 
payout vehicles, (ii) use only dividends, (iii) use only share repurchases, or (iv) do not provide 
any payouts to their shareholders. For example, for the year 1995 we find that 78% of firms 
use only dividends and 22% of all firms provide no payouts at all. For 2006, we find that 10% 
of all firms use both dividends and share repurchases, 39% pay only dividends, 6% use only 
share repurchases and 46% provide no payouts at all. In contrast to the U.S. there is still a 
large fraction of firms in Germany that use only dividends to distribute earnings (cf. Skinner 
(2008) for the U.S.).  
 
– Insert figure 5 about here – 
 
Although the percentage of dividend paying firms mainly decreases over time, the 
mean dividend paid in each year shows an increasing trend. If we consider only companies 
which pay a dividend, this effect is even stronger (see figure 6). While the mean dividend 
distributed by a dividend paying firm in 1995 was about 25 million euro, it increased to over 
100 million euro in 2006. This finding is in line with the empirical evidence for the U.S. 
showing that a small fraction of large, established and profitable firms accounts for the 
majority of aggregated earnings and dividends (cf. DeAngelo et al. (2004)). In particular, the 
10% of the most profitable firms (largest firms) in our sample account for 61% (68%) of all 
dividend payments in the year 1995 (cf. figure 7). This ratio increases dramatically over time. 
In 2006, they account for 91% (90%) of all dividend payments. Similar results for the EU15-
countries and based on an international database have been obtained by von Eije and 
Magginson (2008) and Denis and Osobov (2008).  
 
– Insert figure 6 about here – 
 
– Insert figure 7 about here – 
 
To conclude, we find that the percentage of firms paying dividends is declining over 
our sample period from 1995 to 2006. Contrary to that finding, the aggregate level of 
dividends and the mean dividends paid by firms show the opposite trend, especially if we only 
consider dividend paying firms. However, since the dividend-to-earnings ratio is rather stable 
over time, we conclude that a small fraction of very profitable firms is responsible for the 
majority of aggregate earnings and dividends. Finally, we demonstrate that share repurchases 
are by far less common then dividend payments in Germany. Please note that although only 
mean values are reported in the figures, we find very similar time characteristics for median 
values of the payout ratios. To enhance the clarity of the figures, we have decided not to 
report median and mean values simultaneously. 
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4.3 Family firms vs. non-family firms 
 
The agency cost hypothesis of family management posits that family firms have a 
lower dividend (payout) propensity and level while the income and control hypothesis of 
family ownership predicts the opposite. Hence, whether family firms have a higher or lower 
dividend (payout) propensity and level remains an empirical question that is analyzed in this 
section. We employ a series of probit estimations on the propensity to pay dividends, buy 
back shares and conduct any payout. Within these probit estimations the coefficient of interest 
is the dummy variable for family firms (and to a lesser extent the comparison with the dummy 
variable for the existence of other large, non-family shareholder). Results are reported in table 
5. 
Thereby, in our multivariate analysis we observe that family firms have a significantly 
higher propensity to pay dividends, while the existence of other non-family shareholders has 
the opposite effect (model Ia). With regard to the propensity for share repurchases there seems 
to be no difference between family firms and non-family firms (model Ib). However, the low 
number of only 389 share repurchase events in the 1995 to 2006 period might adversely affect 
the estimation quality of our probit model for share repurchases. While the Pseudo R-square 
for the probit model on dividend payments and total payout is 41% and 33%, it is only 12% 
for the probit model on share repurchases. Hence, the estimation results for share repurchases 
have to be interpreted cautious with regard to the low relative importance of share repurchases 
as a payout vehicle in Germany. If we analyze the overall probability for any kind of payout 
(dividend or share repurchase), we again find that family firms have a significantly higher 
payout probability than non-family firms (while again there is a negative correlation between 
the existence of a non-family controlling shareholder and the payout propensity, cf. model Ic).  
In a second step, we analyze the payout level (cf. table 6). We use “zero distribution 
profits” as proxy for corporate earnings to normalize total dividends (which include dividends 
to common and preferred shares), share repurchases and the sum of both payout vehicles. The 
results on share repurchase activities and total payouts are reported in the appendix (as 
dividends are by far the most important payout vehicle). If compared to non-family firms, we 
find that family firms have a higher dividend payout ratio. The differences in the pooled-OLS-
estimations and random-effects-models are statistically significant at the 5%- and 1%-
confidence-intervall, respectively (cf. model Ia and Ic). If we use firm-fixed effects to control 
for unobserved and time-constant heterogeneity in firm characteristics, the results remain 
qualitatively unchanged. The result is statistically significant at the 10%-level (model Ib). The 
analysis on total payout ratios leads to similar results, while we find no significant differences 
between family and non-family firms in terms of share repurchase ratios (cf. the appendix). 
Overall, our results suggest that family firms are characterized by a higher payout propensity 
and higher payout levels in comparison to non-family firms. In the next section we analyze 
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4.4 Family ownership vs. family management 
 
We have argued that the agency conflicts between shareholders and management 
should be less pronounced if the founding family is at the same time a large shareholder and 
part of the firm’s management or supervisory board. Hence, based on the agency cost 
hypothesis of family management there is less need for payouts in order to reduce the free 
cash flow available at managerial discretion. However, with regard to their long-term 
commitment and the desire to bequeath the family business to future generations, the 
founding family wants to avoid any dilution of their voting rights. In such a situation, payouts 
(especially dividends) are the only feasible opportunity to generate a steady income out of 
their investment. We state this as the income and control hypothesis of family ownership. Cf. 
tables 5 and 6 for the empirical results.  
In a first step, we observe that the propensity to pay dividends is positively affected by 
family ownership while family management does have no impact (table 5, model IIa and IIIa). 
Thereby, it does not matter whether we measure family ownership as a dummy variable (that 
is one if the founding family holds at least 25% of voting rights) or as a continuous variable 
(the cumulative voting rights held by the founding family). A similar effect can be observed 
for the total payout propensity (table 5, model IIc and IIIc). All effects are statistically 
significant at least at the 5%-confidence interval. However, neither family ownership nor 
family management has any impact on the probability of share repurchases (table 5, model IIb 
and IIIb). 
  Regarding the dividend payout ratios we receive similar results. Family ownership has 
a strong positive influence on the dividend payout ratio while the influence of family 
management is insignificant. Thereby, the results are qualitatively similar if we measure 
family ownership as a dummy variable or as a continuous variable (table 6, models IIa to IIc 
and IIIa to IIIc). As shown in the appendix, we find similar results for the total payout ratio 
but no correlation between family ownership and the payout level in terms of share 
repurchases (see the appendix). Again, the goodness of fit is much better in the regression 
models for dividend payments (as indicated by an adjusted R-square of about 25% for the 
OLS- and random-effects-models and 50% for the firm-fixed effects-models) than in the 
regression models for share repurchases (with an adjusted R-square of about 5% in the OLS- 
and random-effects models). This is certainly related to the low importance of share 
repurchases in Germany. The firm-fixed effects models yield qualitatively similar results as 
the pooled OLS-estimations. Hence, the results that family ownership rather than family 
management is the main channel how founding families affect payout policy is robust against 
unobserved, time-constant heterogeneity in firm characteristics. Overall, our results provide 
strong support for the income and control hypotheses of family ownership. It seems that 
family ownership creates a strong desire for dividends (payouts) and at the same time any 
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4.5 Conflicts within the family 
 
The Economist states that tensions within the family can affect payout policy choices. 
Such tensions are important if there is more than one family member involved in the business. 
Intra-family disagreements about payout policy might be pronounced if there are conflicts 
between multiple family members and/or generations. For example, in the early years of the 
business, the founder might be willing to forego corporate payouts in order to develop the 
business while at the same time preserving control. In the later stage of the family business, as 
new family members and/or generations are added to the controlling group, the potential for 
disagreement over the magnitude and timing of payouts might grow (DeAngelo et al. (2009)). 
To investigate this issue in greater detail we follow the methodology of Miller et al. (2007) in 
order to distinguish between family firms that are still dominated by the company founder 
(founder-controlled firms) and family firms where multiple family members are involved at 
the same time or over time (real family firms). Within the universe of family firms in our 
dataset, we find that 62% are founder-controlled firms and 38% are real family firms. We 
would expect that the desire for dividends and payouts is stronger in real family firms than in 
founder-controlled firms with respect to the within-family tensions and common action 
problems among a multitude of family members and/or family generations. Results can be 
found in tables 5 and 6. 
Indeed, we find that the desire for dividends and payouts is stronger in real family 
firms compared to founder-controlled firms. Both coefficients for the dummy variable for 
founder-controlled firms and real family firms are positive and statistically significant in a 
probit model for dividend payments and total payouts, but the coefficients for real family 
firms have a larger magnitude. Moreover, in pooled OLS-estimations and firm-fixed effects 
models we find that only real family firms have higher dividend payout ratios than non-family 
firms. Overall, our results suggest that conflicts within the family play an important role in the 
context of payout decisions. We find strong evidence for higher dividend propensity and level 
in real family firms, whereas indications for higher payout levels in founder-controlled firms 
are limited.  
 
4.6 Controlling shareholders and conflicts between family and non-family shareholders 
 
The rate at which corporations distribute earnings to shareholders via dividends is a 
measure for the expropriation of minority shareholders since dividends transfer wealth on a 
pro rata basis. By contrast, balance-sheet-items and corporate ressources above the dividend 
line can be manipulated in favor of the controlling shareholder (Faccio and Lang (2001)). 
Such manipulation leads to the consumption of private benefits of control or ressource 
tunneling out of the firm to controlling shareholders via outright theft and fraud or “sweet-
heart deals” (asset sales, transfer pricing, excess compensation) at favourable condidtions for 
the controlling shareholders (Johnson et al. (2000), LaPorta et al. (2000a), DeAngelo et al. 
(2009)). Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) argue that large, controlling shareholders want to avoid 
“pro rata distributions” via dividends in order to exploit minority shareholders. They label this 
as their “rent extraction hypothesis”. In particular, they show that majority shareholders in   29
Germany reduce the dividend-payout-ratio while the presence of a large, second shareholder 
mitigates this effect (similar evidence on the rent extraction potential of large shareholders 
within European firms is provided by Faccio and Lang (2001)). Moreover, Gugler and 
Yurtoglu (2003) analyze announcement effects to 736 changes in dividend policies. 
Consistent with their “rent extraction hypothesis” they find stronger stock prize reactions if 
dividends are reduced in those firms that have (1) “an unchecked majority owner” and (2) 
pyramidal ownership structures. We follow the argument of Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and 
Faccio and Lang (2001) and in general corroborate their findings. However, we argue that the 
identity of the controlling shareholder is important. The results are reported in table 7.  
We use four different dummy variables to test the impact of “controlled” and 
“uncontrolled” blockholders: The variable “uncontrolled outside blockholder” equals one if 
an outside blockholder with at least 25% voting rights exists, but no further blockholder with 
ownership stakes over 5%. If at least one such additional blockholder exists the dummy 
variable “controlled outside blockholder” is set to one. A similar procedure applies for family 
blockholders. If the founding family owns more than 25% and no other blockholder with 
voting rights over 5% exists, the variable “uncontrolled family blockholder” equals one. If at 
least one external blockholder exists beneath the founding family, the dummy “controlled 
family blockholder” is set to one. Model Ia shows that the existence of an “uncontrolled 
outside blockholder” has a significant negative impact on the propensity to pay dividends. 
The coefficient of the dummy variable is -0.38 and statistically different from zero at the 1%-
level. If we compare this to the effect of “controlled outside blockholder”, the effect is 
weaker. The coefficient is -0.20 and hence still negative, but of lower magnitude and only 
statistically different from zero at the 10%-level. This result is similar to the one of Gugler 
and Yurtoglu (2003). However, we further argue that founding families are a special type of 
blockholder. In model Ia, we find that the dummy variable for “uncontrolled family 
blockholder” shows a strong positive correlation with the propensity for dividend payments. 
The coefficient of the dummy variable is 0.39 and statistically significant at the 1%-level. 
However, the effect for “controlled family blockholder” is also positive, with a coefficient of 
lower magnitude (0.31) that is also statistically different from zero at the 1%-confidence 
interval. Overall, model Ia suggests that family shareholders in comparison to non-family 
shareholders have exactly the opposite impact on the propensity to pay dividends. This result 
is pronounced if we only include firm-year observations with a loss (model Ib). In this 
specification only the “uncontrolled family blockholder” have a statistically significant 
influence on the propensity to pay dividends. Again, the coefficient is positive with a 
magnitude of 0.49 and statistically different from zero at the 1%-level. By contrast, the 
dummy variables for the other three categories (“uncontrolled” and “controlled” outside 
blockholder as well as “controlled” family blockholder) are insignificant. This suggests that 
family firms are much more likely to continue their dividend payments although they suffer 
from losses.  
Additionally, we find that the number of outside blockholders has a negative effect on 
payout propensity if we analyze all firms (model IIa). Interestingly, this effect changes to the 
opposite if we restrict our test sample to firms with a controlling outside shareholder who 
owns at least 25% of the firm’s voting rights. In this case, the effect of additional   30
blockholders on dividend propensity is positive (model IIb). This finding is consistent with 
the results of Gugler and Yurtolgu (2003), who argue that “rent extraction” of large 
blockholders may be limited if there are other powerful shareholder.  
If we calculate the founding family’s voting rights relative to the voting rights of all 
blockholders (family power), we find that the propensity for dividends is increasing in the 
power of the founding family (model III). Our results are statistically significant at the 1%-
confidence interval.  
The results are unchanged if we measure the influence of the controlling shareholders 
more accurate: For example, we use the outside shareholders’ voting rights instead of a 
dummy variable (not reported) or we use several dummy variables in order to distinguish 
further according to the identity of the outside shareholders (model IVa and IVb). We build 
dummy variables for the following blockholder categories: (i) government blockholder (all 
public authorities), (ii) financial blockholder (banks, insurances, mutual funds, venture capital 
and private equity investors), (iii) individual blockholder (wealthy investors) and (iv) strategic 
blockholder (other companies). Each blockholder holds at least 25% of voting rights. Andres 
(2008) has already analyzed the blockholders’ influence on firm performance in Germany and 
used the same blockholder categories. Our results are similar to the ones of Andres (2008) in a 
different context. We find that while the influence of family shareholders is robust under 
several specifications (and the positive correlation with the propensity to pay dividends 
remains strong), other types of large, controlling shareholders have the opposite or no effect. 
In particular, model Ia shows that large, strategic and financial shareholders have a negative 
influence on the dividend propensity. While the effect for strategic shareholders is statistically 
significant at the 1%-level, the one for financial investors is statistically significant at the 
10%-level. Government blockholder and individual blockholder do not affect payout policy 
(at least the coefficients for these dummy variables are not statistically different from zero). If 
we further analyze only firm-year observations in which a loss occurs, the influence of family 
shareholders remains positive and statistically different from zero at the 1%-level. By 
contrast, the effects of all other types of controlling shareholders are insignificant.  
Overall, the findings suggest that (i) the identity of the controlling shareholder is 
important, (ii) tensions between family and non-family shareholders are present and (iii) that 
while family shareholders have a positive effect on dividends (and total payouts) other types 
of controlling shareholders have the opposite effect. Overall, we interpret these effects in a 
way that the founding family is one particular type of controlling shareholder that is able to 
balance the agency problems stemming from the agency conflict I (between managers and 
shareholders) and the agency conflict II (between majority and minority shareholders). 
Founders and their families constitute a group of controlling shareholders that is beneficial for 
minority shareholders and different from other types of large, controlling owners. This result 
seems to be in line with previous research on the effect of large, controlling shareholders in 
Germany on firm performance. In his study, Andres (2008) finds that founding families 
represent the only type of large, controlling shareholder that has a positive effect on firm 
performance (both on operating profit and Tobin’s Q, in particular if the founding family is 
not only a shareholder but also involved in firm management). Although Andres (2008) 
follows a different research approach by analyzing firm performance, he draws a similar   31
conclusion with regard to benefits of family shareholders and differences in comparison to 
other types of large owners: “Families seem to add value to a company in a way that 
distinguishes them from all other types of blockholder” (Andres (2008), p. 441). Overall, our 
analysis confirms the anecdotal evidence in the Economist statement that conflicts between 
family shareholders and other controlling owners are imperative for payout policy decisions. 
Furthermore, our findings suggest that while family shareholders are beneficial for minority 
shareholders by fostering a “pro-rata distribution of earnings”, other controlling shareholders 
are not.  
 
4.7 Control variables 
 
As described in the section 3 we control for a number of firm- and industry-specific 
characteristics. We find that firm size, profitability and firm age are positively correlated with 
the propensity for dividends or any payout. Larger, older and more profitable firms have a 
higher payout probability. In addition, the usage of control-enhancing instruments (such as 
pyramidal ownership or dual-class shares) and the associated deviation from the one share-
one vote-principle increases the probability for payouts. Firms that operate in industries with a 
large number of dividend paying firms show a higher payout probability. In contrast, firm-
specific risk is negatively correlated with the dividend payment propensity. In some of our 
models, leverage has a negative and significant coefficient. Finally, there seems to be no 
significant influence of the market-to-book ratio (as a proxy for investment opportunities). 
Additionally, we include industry- and year dummy variables in all our models. For the probit 
estimations on share repurchases, we find that the control variables are less significant and 
point partly in different directions. Again, we want to emphasize that these models have to be 
interpreted with caution because of the limited number of share repurchases in Germany.  
  With respect to the dividend payout ratios, we also find a significant and positive 
correlation for firm size, the dummy variable for deviations from the one share-one vote-
principle, firm age and the mean dividend payments within the industry. Moreover, the 
dummy variable for the usage of German GAAP is significant and positive. By contrast, there 
is a significant and negative correlation with leverage and firm-specific risk, while the 
market-to-book value and the dummy variable for the existence of outside blockholder are 
insignificant. In addition, we include industry- and year dummy variables in all our models.  
 
5 Robustness tests 
 
This section explores the robustness of our results. We focus on the following aspects: 
(i) issues of misspecification, (ii) sample composition effects (iii) tax regime effects (iv) 
insider ownership effects and (v) concerns of endogeneity. In this section, we report probit 
estimations for the propensity to pay dividends. Thereby, we analyze differences between 
family and non-family firms. We focus on dividends (rather than share repurchases or total 
payouts) in our robustness tests since dividends are the dominant payout vehicle in Germany. 
However, in general (unreported) robustness tests with the overall propensity for payout 
instead of the dividend payout propensity as dependent variable lead to similar results.   32
Moreover, (unreported) robustness tests with the dividend payout ratio and robustness tests 
with family ownership vs. family management instead of the dummy variable for family firms 
lead to qualitatively similar results as in section 5. Overall, our results prove to be stable along 
several dimensions. We report the results of our robustness tests in table 8. 
 
5.1 Issues of misspecification 
 
Our results are stable against the usage of several alternative control variables, such as 
ln sales or ln employees in lieu of ln assets as a proxy for firm size, ln IPO age in lieu of ln 
firm age as a proxy for the firm’s life cycle stage or total risk in lieu of firm-specific risk. The 
results remain also robust if we use only dividends to common shareholders instead of 
dividends to common and preferred shareholders (unreported).  
In addition, we use a broader definition of a family firm that does not require a 
minimum ownership threshold of 5% voting rights. According to this alternative definition a 
firm qualifies as a family business if the founding family holds 25% of the voting rights 
and/or a member of the founding family is present in the management or supervisory board. 
Essentially, this is the same definition as in Andres (2007, 2008) or in Ampenberger et al. 
(2009). However, model I in table 8 shows that the results are robust against the usage of such 
a broader family firm definition, since the dummy variable for family firms is still significant 
at the 1%-level.  
There is a tendency that large established and profitable firms account for the majority 
of payouts (DeAngelo et al. (2004)). This trend is also confirmed in our sample as over the 
entire sample period on average 10% of the most profitable firms account for 79% of all 
payouts. Moreover, from the perspective of the free-cash-flow hypothesis (Jensen (1986)) the 
disciplinary role of dividend payments should be particularly strong among large and 
established firms. To test, whether non-linear size effects affect our results, we use the median 
firm size in order to divide our sample in a subset of large and small firms in model II. 
Thereby, we find that the coefficient for family firms is positive and statistically different 
from zero at the 1%-significance-level in the subset of large firms but the coefficient for 
family firms is insignificant in the subset of small firms. One reason for this result might be 
indeed that the propensity to pay out dividends is strongly correlated with firm size. In 
general, larger and mature firms are more likely to pay dividends (and distribute their 
earnings) than young and growing firms (which prefer to retain earnings for profitable 
investments).  
Following the previous literature on dividend policy in Germany (Goergen et al. 
(2005) or Andres et al. (2008)), we use “zero-distribution-profits” in order to normalize 
dividend payments, share repurchase and total payouts. One advantage of these payout ratios 
is that they account for the difference in taxation of retained and distributed earnings under 
the full imputation system before 2001. However, from a legal perspective payout decisions 
are based on annual net income (which is also used to calculate payout ratios in former 
empirical work, e.g. in Julio and Ikenberry (2004) or von Eije and Megginson (2008)). 
Additionally, Andres et al. (2008) argue that German firms base their dividend payout 
decisions on cash-flows rather than earnings. For these reasons, we calculate two alternative   33
payout ratios: First, we normalize dividend payments by annual net income (model IIIa) and 
second by cash-flow (IIIb). Thereby, we calculate the cash-flow as the “zero-distribution 
profits” plus depreciation and pension provision and charges (similar as in Goergen et al. 
(2005) and Andres et al. (2008)). In both models the coefficient for family firms remains 
positive. It is statistically different from zero at the 1%-level (model IIIa) and 10%-level 
(model IIIb) respectively.  
Finally, our empirical results are also similar if we use lagged control variables instead 
of contemporaneous control variables (model IVa). In this model the dummy variable for 
family firms remains statistically significant at the 5%-level. If we do not only lag the control 
variables but also the dummy variable for family firms (model IVb), the effect remains 
significant. In general, our results prove to be stable against several issues of 
misspecifications.  
 
5.2 Sample composition effects 
 
Our unbalanced sample is influenced by a large number of firms that went public 
during the 1998 to 2000 IPO boom phase.
24 Against the background of the comparatively less 
developed German stock market this was an uncommon IPO wave. Most of those new lists 
are young high-tech firms that went public at the technology stock exchange “Neuer Markt”. 
Table 1 indicates that the importance of family firms in our sample is increasing over time. 
While in 1995 – the starting year of our sample period – 24% of firms are family businesses 
(55 firms out of 230), in 2006 37% are family businesses (184 out of 494 firms). In the 
context of payout policy decisions, the changing sample composition can affect our results in 
several ways. One concern is that new lists during the 1998 to 2000 period have different firm 
characteristics than established companies. For the U.S., Fama and French (2004) have argued 
that both the number and characteristics of new lists have changed dramatically in the U.S. 
Cross-sectional characteristics of new lists show more left skewed profitability in combination 
with more right skewed growth options resulting in a sharp decline of survival rate. 
Furthermore, Fama and French (2001) show that these changing firm characteristics can have 
a large influence on corporate policy decisions. Along that line, von Eije and Megginson 
(2008) argue that the huge increase in listed firms on technology markets such as the 
Alternative Investment Market (U.K.) or the Neuer Markt (Germany), might be responsible 
for the large decline in terms of cash dividend payers. If we follow the argument that “high-
tech” firms distribute fewer profits among their shareholders due to high internal growth 
opportunities, this might be a reasonable explanation. Hence, we analyze whether the 
changing characteristics of new lists affect our results for firms’ payout policy decisions. To 
do so, we run all regression models for two additional, separate sub-samples: One regression 
is based on a sub-sample of firms whose Initial Public Offering was in the 1998 to 2000 
period and one regression for the sub-sample of firms with an IPO before or after this IPO 
boom phase (models Va and Vb). As an alternative test, we use the full sample and include a 
dummy variable for the Going Public between 1998 and 2000 (model Vc). In general, the 
                                                 
24 Out of the 660 firms in our sample, 328 had their IPO in this time period.    34
three tests show that our results are relatively stable against issues of sample composition. The 
coefficients for family firms are positive in all three specifications. However, we have to 
admit that the level of significance is lower (at a 10%-level) in model Va that includes all 
firms with an IPO between 1998 and 2000. By contrast, the coefficient for family firms 
remains different from zero at the 1%-significance-level in the other two models. This 
suggests that the family firm effect is somewhat stronger among established firms if compared 
to new lists. 
 
5.3 Tax regime effects 
 
One possible concern about our analysis is that changes in the taxation of dividends 
and share repurchases may influence firms’ payout decisions depending on their ownership 
structure. Or in other words: Changes in taxation policy might not affect all firms equally and 
lead to different adjustments of payout policy between family firms and non-family firms. 
Several authors have argued for such a tax clientele effect (cf. e.g. Lie and Lie (1999), Fenn 
and Liang (2001), Perez-Gonzalez (2002), Graham and Kumar (2006), Brown et al. (2007), 
Barclay et al. (forthcoming) and Hsieh and Wang (2008)). Since Germany underwent a major 
tax reform in the year 2001 (cf. section 3.3 about the institutional environment for a detailed 
discussion), we control for this issue by dividing our sample into two sub-periods: one sub-
sample covers only observations during the 1995 to 2000 period (six years under the “old” tax 
regime, model VIa) while the other sub-sample covers only firm-year observations during the 
2001 to 2006 period (six years under the “new” tax regime, model VIb). However, our results 
indicate that family firms have a higher propensity to pay dividends before and after the tax 
reform. The coefficient for family firms is statistically significant at the 5%-level in both time 
periods and has also a similar magnitude. Hence, we argue that our results are not subject to 
changes in the tax system from a full imputation system to a shareholder relief system.  
 
5.4 Insider ownership effects 
 
Insider ownership, i.e. ownership by members of the management and supervisory 
board, is a common phenomenon in the German capital market (Kaserer and Moldenhauer 
(2008)). Hence, there are still a large number of firms with significant (non-family) insider 
ownership. Such insiders might be a similar shareholder category as the founding family with 
regard to their strong desire for control and dividends at the same time. To alleviate the 
concern that we find an insider ownership effect rather than a founding family ownership 
effect, we use the following test: We limit our analysis to those firms which have no insider 
ownership (model VIIa). Additionally, we use the level of insider ownership as an alternative 
control variable (model VIIb). However, we find that in both models (which include only 
firms without insider ownership), family firms in comparison to non-family firms have still a 
significantly higher probability to pay dividends. Overall, based on these tests we argue to 
find a family firm effect rather than an insider ownership effect. 
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5.5 Endogeneity issues 
 
A drawback of our analysis is the potentially endogenous relationship between family 
ownership and control, firm profitability and payout policy. In particular, the founding 
family’s decision to remain a large shareholder may be endogenous. For example, if there are 
information asymmetries between informed family owners and outside investors, the former 
may have incentives to sell their ownership stake if they believe the stock is overvalued or the 
firm will make substantial losses in the future (Villalonga and Amit (2006)). Under such 
circumstances the positive relationship between family ownership and the higher payout 
propensity and level may be subject to reverse causality. In order to alleviate concerns of 
endogeneity, we apply a propensity score based matching technique (described in Heckman et 
al. (1997, 1998), Angrist (1998) or Todd (2006)).  
We identify 78 firms that transition from a family firm to a non-family firm during our 
sample period. The propensity score based matching technique allows us to match those 78 
firms with firms that remain family firms but have a similar propensity to transition into a 
non-family firm. The matching procedure is based on observable firm characteristics using a 
probit model. In our case, the dependent variable of the probit model is a dummy variable for 
the transition from a family firm to a non-family firm. For the determination of this propensity 
we use family ownership (as a floating variable), family management (dummy variable), 
outside blockholder ownership (as a floating variable), firm size and age, profitability and 
industry affiliation one year before the treatment. Most of the variables are statistically 
significant and the Pseudo-R-square is comparatively high with 31%. In particular, we use 
two types of matching estimators: the nearest neighbor estimator and kernel estimator. Based 
on both estimators we compare the propensity to pay dividends two years before the year of 
transition and two years after the year of transition. Thereby, we acknowledge that it takes 
some time for the new management to establish changes in payout policy. Both estimators 
lead to similar results: The propensity to pay dividends is significantly reduced through the 
transition from a family firm to a non-family firm. If we simply analyze the 78 transition 
cases, 12 firms cut dividend payments, while 64 firms continue their prior dividend policy. 
Not surprising, the results for the control group point in the opposite direction: Among the 78 
matched firms in the nearest-neighbor approach, 20 firms even started to pay dividends, 
whereas no firm made a divided cut. If we compare the treatment group with the control 
group (average treatment effect on the treated), the propensity to pay out dividends is about 
40% lower in the treatment group based on nearest neighbor matching. The results are 
statistically significant at least at the 5%-confidence interval (also if we use bootstrapped 
standard errors). Hence, the transition from a family firm to a non-family firm leads to a 
significantly lower propensity for dividend payments. Results from the kernel matching 
estimator are significant as well and point in the same direction. 
Finally, we perform a similar analysis for the dividend payout ratio. Thereby, we find 
that the payout ratio decreases by 25 percentage points based on the nearest neighbor 
matching estimator (average treatment effect on the treated). This result is statistically 
significant at the 5%-confidence interval (t-value of 2.53). However, the kernel matching 
estimator for the payout ratio is insignificant although the coefficient is also negative. We   36
receive similar standard errors if we apply a bootstrap-procedure. Altogether, the robustness 
test for potential endogeneity in the family firm payout relationship based on a propensity 
based matching technique suggests that there is indeed a causal relationship between family 




In this paper, we test two theories why family firms might differ from non-family 
firms in terms of payout policy. The first theory, which refers to lower agency costs in family 
firms (mainly realized by family management) suggests a lower payout propensity and level, 
while the second one, which is related to control considerations and the desire for a steady 
income (associated with family ownership) predicts the opposite.  
  Using a unique, hand-collected panel dataset of 660 publicly-listed firms in Germany 
between 1995 and 2006, we find that overall family firms have a higher propensity (and level) 
of dividend payments and total payouts. As expected with regard to legal restrictions, we find 
that share repurchases are still of minor importance in Germany. We can further show that 
family ownership is the main channel for the higher payout propensity and level. Our results 
are stable against a battery of robustness tests including a propensity score based matching 
estimator to alleviate concerns of endogeneity. 
  Our results further suggest that tensions within the founding family on the one hand 
and conflicts between the founding family and other large, controlling shareholders on the 
other hand are important determinants of payout policy choices. We find that the dividend 
payout level is larger in firms in which family members beyond the founder are important for 
the family business (real family firm) compared to firms mainly controlled by the founder 
(founder-controlled firms). This suggests that disagreements and common action problems 
between a multitude of family members and/or generations are an important determinant of 
payout policy in family firms. In addition, we analyze conflicts between family shareholders 
and other non-family controlling shareholders. Thereby, we can show that family shareholders 
have a positive impact on the propensity to pay dividends while large, non-family 
shareholders have a negative impact. Moreover, the propensity for dividends is increasing in 
the voting power of the founding family relative to the voting power of non-family 
shareholders.  
  Our paper contributes to two strands of literature: With regard to the emerging 
literature on family firms our study is the first to illuminate payout policy in great detail 
(including an analysis of conflicts within the founding family and between the founding 
family and large outside blockholders). With respect to the more mature literature on payout 
policy our study is among the first to explore the influence of controlling shareholders in a 
non-U.S. setting (a major research gap according to DeAngelo et al. (2009)) and with a focus 
on corporate governance aspects rather than tax considerations.  
Overall, our analysis suggests that the identity of the controlling shareholder is 
important. While family shareholders seem to be able to successfully balance agency costs 
from the manager-shareholder and the majority-minority shareholder conflict (as in Andres 
(2008)), by contrast non-family shareholders seem to be not very beneficial for minority   37
shareholders (as in Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) and Faccio and Lang (2001)). However, 
expropriation of minority shareholders has adverse effects on external financing, for example 
the development of stock markets (Shleifer and Vishny (1997), LaPorta et al. (1997, 2000a)). 
From this perspective, our results call for increasing transparency and a better protection of 
minority shareholders against expropriation by large, outside controlling shareholders. Within 
the last years, Germany (partly driven by EU directions) underwent already several legal 
reforms (including voluntary codes) in the security, company and bankruptcy law to increase 
transparency and accountability within the financial system. However, the German case 
shows that the improvement in the regulation itself (Goergen et al. (2008a, 2008b)) needs to 
be accompanied by strong legal regulatory and judicial enforcement in order to further 
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 Year Firms Family Firms Real Family Firms Founder-controlled Firms Non-Family Firms
1995 230 55 43 12 175
1996 235 59 45 14 176
1997 250 66 50 16 184
1998 312 97 63 34 215
1999 430 180 78 102 250
2000 566 266 93 173 300
2001 568 265 92 173 303
2002 542 238 70 168 304
2003 514 218 68 150 296
2004 500 199 60 139 301
2005 494 189 55 134 305
2006 494 184 56 128 310
5135 2016 773 1243 3119
Table 1: Composition of sample
Note: This table shows the development of the sample composition over time. Column 1 presents the 12 sample years between 1995 and
2006, column 2 the number of firms in each year, column 3 the number of family firms, column 4 the number of real family firms, column 5
the number of founder-controlled firms and column 6 the number of non-family firms in each year.Variable group
Divergence Cashflow Rights [Dummy]
Leverage
HGB Accounting [Dummy] Dummy which is 1 if the firm uses HGB accounting and zero if it applies IFRS or US-GAAP accounting
Mean Industry Level
Family Firm Broad [Dummy]
High-Tech Firm [Dummy]
Insider Ownership [Floating]






Uncontrolled Outside Blockholder [Dummy]
Controlled Outside Blockholder [Dummy]
Controlled Family Blockholder [Dummy]




Dummy which is 1 if (a) the cumulative ownership stake of the founding family is at least 25% and/or (b) 
a member of the founding family is represented in either the management or supervisory board and the 
cumulative ownership stake of the founding family is at least 5%
Family Ownership [Dummy] Equals 1 if stock ownership held by all members of the founding family is at least 25%
Family Management [Dummy] Equals 1 if a member of the founding family is involved in the management or supervisory board
Family Ownership [Floating]
Family Power Founding family ownership / total block-ownership 
Variable name Description of variable
Percentage of stock ownership held by all members of the founding family
Firm Size [Ln] Ln of the firm's total assets
Real Family Firm [Dummy]
Dummy which is 1 if (a) the ownership stake of the members of the founding family (except founders)  
is at least 25% and/or (b) a member of the founding family (except founders)  is represented in either 
the management or supervisory board and the cumulative ownership stake of the founding family 
(except founders) is at least 5%
Founder-controlled Firm [Dummy] Dummy which is 1 if the firm is a family firm but does not fulfil the criteria of a real family firm
Dummy which equals 1 if the firm pay a dividend
Market-to-Book
Dividend
Dummy which equals 1 if (a) the founding family owns at least 25% of the firm's voting rights and (b) at 
least one outside blockholder with more than 5% of the firm's voting rights is present and zero otherwise
Mean level of the dependent variable in the firm's industry for each year
Equals 1 if the firm went public during 1998 and 2000
Dummy which equals 1 if (a) the founding family owns at least 25% of the firm's voting rights and (b) no 
outside blockholder with more than 5% of the firm's voting rights is present and zero otherwise
Dummy which equals 1 if a financial investor owns at least 25% of the firm's voting rights and zero 
otherwise
Dummy which equals 1 if public authorities own at least 25% of the firm's voting rights and zero 
otherwise
Total dividends / (Zero distribution profit + depreciations + changes in pension provisions); Equals 1 if 
calculated payout ratio is below 0 or above  1.
Dummy which equals 1 if the firm pays a dividend or repurchases own shares
Total dividends / zero dividend profits; Equals 1 if calculated payout ratio is below 0 or above  1.
Dummy which equals 1 if the firm repurchases own shares
Share Repurchase Payout Ratio (SPR)
Share repurchase volume / zero dividend profits; Equals 1 if calculated payout ratio is below 0 or above  
1.
Table 2: Definition of Variables
Payout Variables
Profitability
Total Payout Ratio (TPR)
Payout  
Outside Blockholder [Dummy] Equals 1 if a outside blockholder with at least 25% of the firm's voting rights exists
Dividend Payout Ratio (DPR)
Repurchase
(Total dividends plus share repurchase volume) / zero dividend profits; Equals 1 if calculated payout 
ratio is below 0 or above  1.
Dummy which equals 1 if a strategic investor owns at least 25% of the firm's voting rights and zero 
otherwise
Dummy which equals 1 if a private outside investor owns at least 25% of the firm's voting rights and 
zero otherwise
Total liabilities / (Book value of equity + total liabilities)
Zero distribution profits / total assets
Equals one if the firm issues dual class shares or if the largest shareholder shows a divergence of his 
cashflow and voting rights
Dummy which is one if (a) the cumulative ownership stake of the founding family is at least 25% and/or 
(b) a member of the founding family is represented in either the management or supervisory board 
Market value of the firm / book value of the firm





Total dividends / net income; Equals 1 if calculated payout ratio is below 0 or above  1.
Cumulative ownership of firm insiders (either representatives of the firm's management or supervisory 
board)
Dummy which equals 1 if (a) an outside investor owns at least 25% of the firm's voting rights and (b) at 
least one further outside blockholder with more than 5% of the firm's voting rights is present and zero 
otherwise
Dummy which equals 1 if (a) an outside investor owns at least 25% of the firm's voting rights and (b) no 
second outside blockholder with more than 5% of the firm's voting rights is present and zero otherwise
Firm Age [Ln]
Residuals' sum of squares from a regression of the individual stock returns on the returns of the market 
(CDAX)
Firm Specific RiskMean Median Mean Median Mean Median t-test
Corporate Governance Aspects
Founding Family Ownership [%] 17,9 0,0 45,0 0,5 0,0 0,0 38,88
Outside Blockholder [%] 33,7 20,3 12,0 0,0 48,0 50,0 -19,22
Size Management Board 3,2 3,0 3,0 3,0 3,3 3,0 -2,48
Size Supervisory Board 7,6 6,0 5,3 3,0 9,0 6,0 -10,54
Firm Size and age
Assets (in million €) 2988 143 1042 77 4252 229 -2,99
Sales (in million €) 2501 167 1184 81 3362 278 -2,65
Employees 11380 1023 6739 450 14394 1646 -1,95
Firm Age 53 28 31 15 67 61 -9,42
IPO Age 15 6 6 4 20 9 -11,73
Accounting figures
Profitability 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -4,96
Market-to-Book 2,9 1,7 3,0 1,7 2,7 1,7 0,55
Leverage 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,5 0,6 0,7 -6,94
Dependent variables
Dividend Propensity 0,51 1,00 0,43 0,00 0,56 1,00 -4,11
Share Repurchase Propensity 0,11 0,00 0,14 0,00 0,09 0,00 3,08
Payout Propensity 0,63 1,00 0,57 1,00 0,66 1,00 -2,76
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio 0,31 0,06 0,26 0,00 0,34 0,17 -4,11
Adjusted Share Repurchase Payout Ratio 0,05 0,00 0,07 0,00 0,04 0,00 3,51
Adjusted Total Payout Ratio 0,36 0,20 0,33 0,10 0,38 0,25 -2,42
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2.  ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively. The t-statistics are corrected for serial correlation. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics 1
All Firms Family Firms  Non-Family Firms t-test t-test
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median (RFF vs NFF) (FCF vs NFF)
Corporate Governance Aspects
Non-Founder Founding Family Ownership [%] 52,5 54,0 2,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 26,84 0,67
Founder Ownership [%] 3,1 0,0 35,6 35,5 0,0 0,0 3,21 25,97
Outside Blockholder [%] 0,1 0,0 0,1 0,1 0,5 0,5 -14,49 -19,13
Size Management Board 3,1 3,0 2,9 3,0 3,3 3,0 -0,90 -2,82
Size Supervisory Board 6,6 6,0 4,5 3,0 9,0 6,0 -5,16 -12,64
Firm Size and age
Assets (in million €) 1139 185 979 57 4252 229 -3,11 -2,62
Sales (in million €) 1554 205 943 50 3362 278 -1,93 -2,45
Employees 8124 1255 5824 298 14394 1646 -1,48 -1,63
Firm Age 55 39 17 11 67 61 -2,10 -15,22
IPO Age 8 5 4 3 20 9 -8,03 -12,85
Accounting figures
Profitability 0,0 0,0 -0,1 0,0 0,0 0,0 -1,40 -5,37
Market-to-Book 3,2 1,7 2,9 1,7 2,7 1,7 0,68 0,34
Leverage 0,6 0,6 0,5 0,4 0,6 0,7 -3,04 -7,59
Dependent variables
Dividend Propensity 0,63 1,00 0,29 0,00 0,56 1,00 1,46 -7,73
Share Repurchase Propensity 0,11 0,00 0,16 0,00 0,09 0,00 0,88 3,59
Payout Propensity 0,75 1,00 0,45 0,00 0,66 1,00 2,30 -5,87
Adjusted Dividend Payout Ratio 0,37 0,26 0,18 0,00 0,34 0,17 0,98 -7,53
Adjusted Share Repurchase Payout Ratio 0,06 0,00 0,08 0,00 0,04 0,00 1,48 3,70
Adjusted Total Payout Ratio 0,43 0,33 0,26 0,00 0,38 0,25 1,48 -4,76
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively. The t-statistics are corrected for serial correlation. RFF stands for real
family firm, FCF indicates a founder-controlled firm and NFF a non-family firm. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics 2
Real Family Firms  Founder-controlled Firm Non-Family Firms Model I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c V a V b V c
Dividend Repurcase Payout Dividend Repurcase Payout Dividend Repurcase Payout Dividend Repurcase Payout
Family Firm [Dummy] 0.31*** 0.15 0.28***
(3.25) (1.62) (3.16)
Family Ownership [Dummy] 0.30*** 0.14 0.35***
(2.60) (1.29) (3.44)
Family Management [Dummy] 0.095 -0.026 0.0014
(0.72) (-0.21) (0.012)
Family Ownership [Floating] 0.56** 0.26 0.73***
(2.39) (1.27) (3.52)
Family Management [Dummy] 0.085 -0.028 -0.031
(0.63) (-0.23) (-0.27)
Founder-controlled Firm [Dummy] 0.26** 0.22** 0.23**
(2.39) (2.04) (2.27)
Real Family Firm [Dummy] 0.37*** 0.058 0.34***
(2.89) (0.44) (2.92)
Outside Blockholder [Dummy] -0.32*** -0.16 -0.25*** -0.30*** -0.18* -0.23** -0.29*** -0.18* -0.22** -0.31*** -0.16 -0.24***
(-3.11) (-1.60) (-2.64) (-2.83) (-1.77) (-2.45) (-2.78) (-1.72) (-2.29) (-3.08) (-1.61) (-2.59)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.30*** 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.11*** 0.24*** 0.30*** 0.11*** 0.24***
(8.02) (3.39) (7.20) (8.09) (3.30) (7.19) (8.07) (3.30) (7.17) (7.98) (3.45) (7.16)
Profitability 0.57*** 0.087 0.23 0.56*** 0.076 0.21 0.56*** 0.077 0.21 0.57*** 0.092 0.23
(3.34) (0.66) (1.51) (3.26) (0.57) (1.39) (3.28) (0.58) (1.39) (3.32) (0.70) (1.48)
Divergence Cashflow Rights [Dummy] 0.45*** -0.040 0.34** 0.45*** -0.045 0.33** 0.44*** -0.053 0.31* 0.44*** -0.020 0.34**
(2.73) (-0.26) (2.11) (2.72) (-0.30) (2.04) (2.67) (-0.35) (1.95) (2.70) (-0.13) (2.07)
Leverage -0.90*** -0.90*** -1.15*** -0.91*** -0.90*** -1.16*** -0.89*** -0.90*** -1.16*** -0.91*** -0.89*** -1.16***
(-4.52) (-4.58) (-6.12) (-4.51) (-4.61) (-6.14) (-4.43) (-4.60) (-6.12) (-4.54) (-4.53) (-6.15)
Firm Specific Risk -2.67*** -0.48*** -2.20*** -2.66*** -0.47*** -2.20*** -2.67*** -0.47*** -2.21*** -2.66*** -0.49*** -2.19***
(-12.0) (-2.75) (-11.3) (-11.9) (-2.72) (-11.3) (-12.0) (-2.71) (-11.4) (-12.0) (-2.80) (-11.3)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.11** -0.066 0.12*** 0.10** -0.071* 0.11*** 0.10** -0.070* 0.11*** 0.10** -0.060 0.11***
(2.31) (-1.61) (2.90) (2.23) (-1.75) (2.72) (2.20) (-1.72) (2.68) (2.18) (-1.45) (2.74)
Market-to-Book 0.00090 -0.0015 0.00039 0.00085 -0.0015 0.00035 0.00093 -0.0013 0.00042 0.00085 -0.0014 0.00036
(0.78) (-0.24) (0.29) (0.75) (-0.24) (0.26) (0.82) (-0.22) (0.31) (0.74) (-0.22) (0.27)
Mean Industry Level 3.09*** 5.92*** 3.08*** 3.12*** 5.93*** 3.08*** 3.10*** 5.91*** 3.10*** 3.09*** 5.88*** 3.07***
(6.19) (6.20) (5.70) (6.23) (6.18) (5.69) (6.17) (6.15) (5.65) (6.19) (6.16) (5.68)
Constant -4.98*** -3.38*** -4.00*** -4.90*** -3.33*** -4.15*** -4.89*** -3.35*** -4.16*** -4.80*** -3.33*** -3.97***
(-6.62) (-5.02) (-5.32) (-6.51) (-4.84) (-5.42) (-6.49) (-4.84) (-5.41) (-6.39) (-4.67) (-5.29)
Observations 3894 3125 3536 3894 3125 3536 3894 3125 3536 3894 3125 3536
Number of clusters 589 546 567 589 546 567 589 546 567 589 546 567
Pseudo R-squared  0.41 0.12 0.33 0.41 0.12 0.33 0.41 0.12 0.33 0.41 0.12 0.33
Model Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Table 5: Propensity for Payout - Family Influence
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. All models are pooled probit regressions. Time and industry dummies are included. The standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for serial correlation on a
firm level and for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively.Model I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c V a V b V c
Dummy Family Firm 0.043** 0.048* 0.045***
(2.34) (1.79) (2.73)
Family Ownership [Dummy] 0.057*** 0.067** 0.056***
(2.71) (2.46) (2.96)
Family Management [Dummy] 0.0011 0.024 0.0078
(0.048) (0.71) (0.38)
Family Ownership [Floating] 0.10** 0.13** 0.11***
(2.49) (2.01) (2.71)
Family Management [Dummy] -0.00061 0.023 0.0061
(-0.027) (0.69) (0.29)
Founder-controlled Firm [Dummy] 0.032 0.034 0.033*
(1.52) (1.19) (1.78)
Real Family Firm [Dummy] 0.056** 0.076* 0.062***
(2.22) (1.93) (2.59)
Outside Blockholder [Dummy] -0.0099 0.015 -0.0032 -0.0070 0.019 0.00040 -0.0060 0.020 0.0014 -0.0091 0.016 -0.0022
(-0.55) (0.64) (-0.19) (-0.38) (0.81) (0.023) (-0.33) (0.85) (0.082) (-0.51) (0.67) (-0.13)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.032*** 0.077*** 0.039*** 0.032*** 0.075*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.076*** 0.040*** 0.032*** 0.075*** 0.039***
(5.65) (5.08) (7.67) (5.75) (5.01) (7.77) (5.71) (5.07) (7.75) (5.65) (5.04) (7.69)
Divergence Cashflow Rights [Dummy] 0.047* -0.012 0.018 0.045 -0.013 0.017 0.043 -0.012 0.016 0.045 -0.012 0.017
(1.72) (-0.37) (0.72) (1.63) (-0.39) (0.66) (1.53) (-0.37) (0.61) (1.64) (-0.35) (0.68)
Leverage -0.058* -0.044 -0.056* -0.059* -0.042 -0.055* -0.057* -0.041 -0.053* -0.058* -0.043 -0.055*
(-1.93) (-1.16) (-1.93) (-1.95) (-1.14) (-1.93) (-1.87) (-1.11) (-1.87) (-1.94) (-1.16) (-1.93)
Firm Specific Risk -0.22*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.22*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.22*** -0.12*** -0.17*** -0.22*** -0.12*** -0.17***
(-4.26) (-4.72) (-4.46) (-4.27) (-4.74) (-4.49) (-4.27) (-4.74) (-4.49) (-4.27) (-4.76) (-4.48)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.014* -0.013 0.018** 0.014 -0.0083 0.018** 0.014 -0.0088 0.018** 0.013 -0.014 0.017**
(1.65) (-0.47) (2.24) (1.59) (-0.31) (2.21) (1.59) (-0.32) (2.21) (1.56) (-0.52) (2.12)
Market-to-Book -0.000047 0.00023 0.00011 -0.000057 0.00022 0.000099 -0.000041 0.00023 0.00011 -0.000054 0.00022 0.000099
(-0.22) (1.61) (0.77) (-0.28) (1.56) (0.74) (-0.19) (1.64) (0.81) (-0.26) (1.56) (0.74)
HGB Accounting [Dummy] 0.078*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.077*** 0.061*** 0.066*** 0.075*** 0.062*** 0.065*** 0.075*** 0.060*** 0.064***
(3.75) (2.68) (3.49) (3.71) (2.66) (3.46) (3.60) (2.68) (3.40) (3.65) (2.62) (3.39)
Mean Industry Level 0.80*** 0.91*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.90*** 0.82*** 0.80*** 0.91*** 0.82***
(7.67) (7.33) (7.60) (7.66) (7.32) (7.60) (7.65) (7.30) (7.57) (7.67) (7.33) (7.60)
Constant -0.41*** -0.89*** -0.54*** -0.42*** -0.90*** -0.55*** -0.41*** -0.91*** -0.55*** -0.40*** -0.87*** -0.53***
(-3.12) (-4.03) (-4.42) (-3.15) (-4.10) (-4.45) (-3.12) (-4.14) (-4.43) (-3.09) (-3.98) (-4.47)
Observations 3833 3833 3833 3833 3833 3833 3833 3833 3833 3833 3833 3833
Number of clusters 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588 588
Adj. R-squared  0.25 0,5 0,25 0.25 0,5 0,25 0.25 0,5 0,25 0.25 0,5 0,25
Model OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Table 6: Dividend Payout Ratio (DPR) - Family Influence
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. Time and industry dummies are included. Models are OLS, random-effects or firm-fixed effects regressions. The standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for serial correlation on a firm level
and for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively.Power of Family
Model I a I b II a II b III IV a IV b
All firms Only non-profitable firms All firms Only firms with blockholder Relation of voting rights All firms Only non-profitable firms
Uncontrolled Outside Blockholder [Dummy] -0.38*** -0.18
(-3.10) (-1.15)
Controlled Outside Blockholder [Dummy] -0.20* -0.15
(-1.66) (-0.87)
Controlled Family Blockholder [Dummy] 0.31*** 0.22
(2.80) (1.36)
Uncontrolled Family Blockholder [Dummy] 0.39*** 0.49***
(3.14) (2.92)




Family Firm [Dummy] 0.27*** 0.38***
(2.78) (2.97)
Goverment Blockholder [Dummy] -0.32 -0.40
(-1.25) (-1.02)
Financial Blockholder [Dummy] -0.24* -0.19
(-1.77) (-1.03)
Private Blockholder [Dummy] 0.22 0.021
(1.16) (0.073)
Strategic Blockholder [Dummy] -0.44*** -0.15
(-3.37) (-0.97)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.29*** 0.26*** 0.29*** 0.30*** 0.31***
(7.89) (6.61) (7.33) (4.78) (7.63) (7.88) (6.73)
Divergence Cashflow Rights [Dummy] 0.45*** 0.18 0.40** 0.51** 0.57*** 0.40** 0.18
(2.73) (0.81) (2.36) (2.08) (3.44) (2.48) (0.79)
Profitability 0.54*** -0.079 0.55*** 0.33 0.43*** 0.57*** -0.071
(3.23) (-0.22) (3.36) (1.08) (2.63) (3.35) (-0.20)
Leverage -0.92*** -0.53** -0.97*** -1.45*** -0.94*** -0.93*** -0.51**
(-4.57) (-2.16) (-4.74) (-4.18) (-4.59) (-4.68) (-2.07)
Firm Specific Risk -2.65*** -2.09*** -2.50*** -2.12*** -2.60*** -2.69*** -2.16***
(-11.9) (-7.01) (-11.1) (-6.50) (-11.6) (-12.2) (-7.25)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.096** 0.050 0.082* 0.081 0.099** 0.11** 0.063
(2.15) (0.86) (1.84) (1.22) (2.20) (2.36) (1.08)
Market-to-Book 0.00086 0.00070 0.00071 0.000012 0.00081 0.00100 0.00073
(0.75) (0.62) (0.60) (0.011) (0.69) (0.87) (0.64)
Mean Industry Level 3.10*** 5.41*** 3.12*** 3.22*** 3.15*** 3.15*** 5.49***
(6.10) (5.16) (6.59) (3.92) (6.29) (6.27) (5.24)
Constant -4.92*** -7.97*** -4.63*** -4.89*** -4.93*** -4.81*** -7.83***
(-6.49) (-6.28) (-6.27) (-4.20) (-6.52) (-6.33) (-6.15)
Observations 3894 1257 3894 1514 3894 3894 1257
Number of clusters 589 463 589 317 589 589 463
Pseudo / adjusted R-squared  0.41 0.39 0.39 0.35 0.40 0.41 0.39
Model Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Table 7: Propensity for Dividend - Blockholder Influence
Controlled vs. Uncontrolled Blockholder Identity of Blockholder
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. All models are pooled probit regressions. Time and industry dummies are included. The standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for serial correlation on a firm level and for
heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively.
Number of Outside BlockholderDefinition
Model I II a II b III a III b IV a IV b V a V b V c VI a VI b VII a VII b
Broad definition Small firms Large firms DPR / Net income DPR / Cashflow Only Control All IPO 98 - 00 IPO before / after Dummy IPO 95 - 00 01 - 06 No IO IO as control
Family Firm [Dummy] 0.056 0.54*** 0.040** 0.036** 0.26** 0.21** 0.25* 0.49*** 0.32*** 0.36** 0.29*** 0.91** 0.18*
(0.39) (3.88) (2.17) (2.06) (2.48) (1.97) (1.78) (3.54) (3.39) (2.36) (2.58) (2.38) (1.78)
Family Firm Broad [Dummy] 0.32***
(2.96)
High-Tech Firm [Dummy] -0.13
(-0.93)
Insider Ownership [Flaoting] 0.66***
(2.99)
Outside Blockholder [Dummy] -0.33*** -0.32* -0.37*** -0.0074 -0.0020 -0.35*** -0.37*** -0.057 -0.40*** -0.32*** -0.28** -0.33*** -0.19 -0.13
(-3.12) (-1.94) (-2.89) (-0.42) (-0.12) (-3.21) (-3.35) (-0.35) (-3.06) (-3.12) (-2.13) (-2.64) (-1.13) (-1.10)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.30*** 0.31*** 0.24*** 0.025*** 0.0067 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.31*** 0.30*** 0.23*** 0.34*** 0.27*** 0.32***
(8.18) (3.02) (4.88) (4.64) (1.41) (7.78) (7.78) (5.39) (6.12) (7.93) (4.80) (7.91) (5.21) (8.08)
Divergence Cashflow Rights [Dummy] 0.46*** -0.026 0.54*** 0.049* -0.0023 1.27*** 1.28*** 0.068 0.50** 0.43*** 0.72*** 0.37* 0.56** 0.40**
(2.79) (-0.084) (2.66) (1.75) (-0.11) (7.50) (7.53) (0.27) (2.17) (2.62) (2.77) (1.96) (2.26) (2.39)
Profitability 0.59*** 0.46** 0.98** 0.39** 0.39** 0.62*** 0.39 0.57*** 0.70* 0.58*** 0.41 0.53***
(3.43) (2.36) (1.99) (2.21) (2.19) (3.05) (1.13) (3.33) (1.74) (3.21) (1.05) (3.13)
Leverage -0.88*** -0.65** -1.28*** -0.035 -0.19*** -1.27*** -1.27*** -0.11 -1.98*** -0.94*** -1.91*** -0.51** -1.56*** -0.95***
(-4.40) (-2.31) (-4.13) (-1.40) (-4.65) (-5.56) (-5.59) (-0.40) (-5.65) (-4.60) (-5.61) (-2.27) (-3.95) (-4.73)
Firm Specific Risk -2.68*** -2.35*** -2.84*** -0.21*** -0.13** -2.46*** -2.47*** -2.66*** -2.58*** -2.63*** -2.63*** -2.68*** -2.29*** -2.68***
(-11.9) (-8.12) (-8.76) (-4.36) (-2.41) (-9.68) (-9.72) (-8.70) (-7.86) (-11.9) (-8.38) (-9.50) (-6.42) (-12.2)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.11** 0.12 0.098* 0.015* 0.0033 0.12** 0.12** 0.10 0.11* 0.092* -0.011 0.16*** 0.16** 0.096**
(2.40) (1.44) (1.80) (1.83) (0.46) (2.51) (2.48) (1.40) (1.65) (1.85) (-0.19) (3.01) (2.40) (2.10)
Market-to-Book 0.00087 0.0013 0.00057 -0.000097 0.00024 -0.00031 -0.00034 0.0019 0.00078 0.00087 -0.0015 0.0045** 0.00051 0.00099
(0.78) (0.61) (0.43) (-0.52) (0.92) (-0.24) (-0.27) (0.96) (0.62) (0.76) (-0.76) (2.49) (0.43) (0.86)
HGB Accounting [Dummy] 0.042** 0.028
(2.05) (1.51)
Mean Industry Level 3.09*** 2.24*** 3.82*** 0.81*** 0.95*** 1.94*** 1.91*** 1.41 4.10*** 3.05*** 4.39*** 2.42*** 3.73*** 3.10***
(6.17) (2.86) (5.11) (6.42) (7.95) (3.93) (3.87) (1.50) (5.50) (6.06) (4.28) (3.01) (4.67) (6.11)
Constant -5.08*** -2.89* -4.67*** -0.31** 0.059 -3.96*** -3.97*** -3.71*** -5.01*** -4.70*** -3.57*** -5.60*** -5.30*** -5.35***
(-6.71) (-1.92) (-4.59) (-2.37) (0.62) (-4.98) (-5.04) (-3.11) (-5.41) (-6.06) (-3.07) (-5.69) (-4.68) (-6.83)
Observations 3894 1663 2231 3922 2506 3315 3315 1692 2198 3890 1404 2490 1617 3894
Number of clusters 589 286 303 596 386 544 544 303 284 587 410 525 307 589
Pseudo / adjusted R-squared  0.41 0.32 0.30 0.22 0.097 0.41 0.41 0.35 0.35 0.41 0.33 0.42 0.36 0.41
Model Probit Probit Probit OLS OLS Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit Probit
Table 8: Dividend Propensity Robustness Tests
Insider owernship (IO) Tax regime effects
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. Models are pooled probit or OLS regressions. Time and industry dummies are included. The standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for serial correlation on a firm level and for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-
White-Sandwich estimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively. 
Size effects Alternative Payout Measures Lagged variables Sample composition effectsModel I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c V a V b V c
Dummy Family Firm 0.0086 -0.0037 0.0080
(0.89) (-0.16) (0.68)
Family Ownership [Dummy] 0.019 0.0055 0.016
(1.40) (0.22) (1.09)
Family Management [Dummy] -0.010 -0.0053 -0.0084
(-0.74) (-0.19) (-0.54)
Family Ownership [Floating] 0.031 0.033 0.037
(1.33) (0.82) (1.47)
Family Management [Dummy] -0.0098 -0.0086 -0.011
(-0.69) (-0.31) (-0.66)
Founder-controlled Firm [Dummy] 0.0088 -0.015 0.0031
(0.71) (-0.59) (0.23)
Real Family Firm [Dummy] 0.0084 0.017 0.015
(0.62) (0.61) (0.96)
Outside Blockholder [Dummy] -0.019** -0.022 -0.021** -0.020** -0.021 -0.022** -0.020** -0.020 -0.021** -0.020** -0.021 -0.021**
(-2.33) (-1.31) (-2.14) (-2.27) (-1.28) (-2.10) (-2.24) (-1.17) (-1.99) (-2.32) (-1.26) (-2.09)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.0044 0.0083 0.0032 0.0042 0.0081 0.0030 0.0042 0.0081 0.0030 0.0045 0.0078 0.0031
(1.31) (0.78) (1.08) (1.26) (0.76) (1.00) (1.24) (0.76) (0.99) (1.29) (0.73) (1.01)
Divergence Cashflow Rights [Dummy] -0.020 -0.023 -0.018 -0.022 -0.023 -0.019 -0.022 -0.023 -0.020 -0.020 -0.022 -0.018
(-1.51) (-1.41) (-1.35) (-1.59) (-1.38) (-1.40) (-1.64) (-1.38) (-1.45) (-1.52) (-1.33) (-1.38)
Leverage -0.055*** -0.022 -0.049*** -0.056*** -0.022 -0.050*** -0.055*** -0.022 -0.049*** -0.055*** -0.022 -0.049***
(-2.71) (-0.74) (-2.97) (-2.69) (-0.74) (-2.97) (-2.68) (-0.71) (-2.94) (-2.71) (-0.74) (-2.97)
Firm Specific Risk -0.013 0.0015 -0.010 -0.012 0.0013 -0.0098 -0.012 0.0011 -0.0100 -0.013 0.0030 -0.0098
(-0.74) (0.077) (-0.63) (-0.69) (0.067) (-0.60) (-0.71) (0.056) (-0.61) (-0.75) (0.16) (-0.59)
Firm Age [Ln] -0.0046 0.048** -0.0037 -0.0051 0.048** -0.0042 -0.0051 0.049** -0.0042 -0.0046 0.046** -0.0041
(-1.13) (2.02) (-0.83) (-1.23) (2.01) (-0.91) (-1.22) (2.05) (-0.91) (-1.12) (1.97) (-0.92)
Market-to-Book -9.6e-07 0.00020*** 0.000080 9.7e-07 0.00020*** 0.000081 2.4e-06 0.00020*** 0.000083 -9.1e-07 0.00020*** 0.000079
(-0.013) (2.87) (1.55) (0.014) (2.87) (1.57) (0.034) (2.89) (1.61) (-0.013) (2.87) (1.54)
HGB Accounting [Dummy] -0.019 -0.012 -0.015 -0.020 -0.013 -0.016 -0.020 -0.012 -0.016 -0.019 -0.013 -0.016
(-1.45) (-1.11) (-1.36) (-1.53) (-1.11) (-1.42) (-1.57) (-1.09) (-1.45) (-1.42) (-1.15) (-1.41)
Mean Industry Level 0.97*** 1.14*** 1.04*** 0.96*** 1.14*** 1.04*** 0.96*** 1.14*** 1.04*** 0.97*** 1.14*** 1.04***
(4.48) (4.88) (4.66) (4.47) (4.88) (4.65) (4.47) (4.89) (4.65) (4.48) (4.89) (4.66)
Constant 0.031 -0.22 0.037 0.038 -0.22 0.045 0.038 -0.23 0.042 0.031 -0.21 0.040
(0.55) (-1.34) (0.70) (0.66) (-1.33) (0.81) (0.67) (-1.37) (0.75) (0.54) (-1.28) (0.75)
Observations 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246
Number of clusters 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544
Adj. R-squared  0.048 0,31 0.055 0.049 0,31 0,056 0.048 0,31 0,056 0.048 0,31 0.055
Model OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Table 9: Share Repurchase Payout Ratio (SPR) - Family Influence
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. Time and industry dummies are included. Models are OLS, random-effects or firm-fixed effects regressions. The standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for serial correlation on a firm level
and for heteroscedasticity using the Huber-White-Sandwich estimator based on White (1980). T-statistics are presented in parentheses. ***, ** and * indicate significance on the 1%-, 5%- and 10%-level respectively.Model I a I b I c II a II b II c III a III b III c V a V b V c
Dummy Family Firm 0.045** 0.041 0.046**
(2.27) (1.23) (2.46)
Family Ownership [Dummy] 0.071*** 0.049 0.060***
(3.04) (1.50) (2.75)
Family Management [Dummy] -0.017 0.017 -0.0033
(-0.67) (0.37) (-0.13)
Family Ownership [Floating] 0.13*** 0.13* 0.12***
(2.88) (1.75) (2.76)
Family Management [Dummy] -0.020 0.012 -0.0070
(-0.76) (0.27) (-0.27)
Founder-controlled Firm [Dummy] 0.040* 0.016 0.036*
(1.69) (0.46) (1.65)
Real Family Firm [Dummy] 0.052* 0.087* 0.061**
(1.96) (1.86) (2.31)
Outside Blockholder [Dummy] -0.028 -0.0032 -0.021 -0.028 -0.00085 -0.019 -0.026 0.0025 -0.017 -0.027 -0.0012 -0.020
(-1.40) (-0.12) (-1.11) (-1.38) (-0.031) (-1.02) (-1.28) (0.091) (-0.89) (-1.38) (-0.043) (-1.05)
Firm Size [Ln] 0.027*** 0.080*** 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.080*** 0.036*** 0.026*** 0.080*** 0.036*** 0.027*** 0.079*** 0.035***
(4.61) (4.05) (6.51) (4.64) (4.02) (6.51) (4.60) (4.07) (6.51) (4.60) (4.01) (6.49)
Divergence Cashflow Rights [Dummy] 0.035 -0.010 0.014 0.031 -0.011 0.012 0.028 -0.011 0.010 0.034 -0.0087 0.013
(1.21) (-0.29) (0.51) (1.07) (-0.30) (0.43) (0.95) (-0.30) (0.36) (1.17) (-0.24) (0.48)
Leverage -0.11*** -0.054 -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.052 -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.051 -0.10*** -0.11*** -0.053 -0.10***
(-2.92) (-1.22) (-3.09) (-2.91) (-1.19) (-3.08) (-2.88) (-1.15) (-3.04) (-2.94) (-1.22) (-3.10)
Firm Specific Risk -0.31*** -0.13*** -0.23*** -0.30*** -0.13*** -0.22*** -0.31*** -0.13*** -0.22*** -0.31*** -0.13*** -0.23***
(-8.95) (-4.18) (-7.84) (-8.77) (-4.13) (-7.71) (-8.85) (-4.15) (-7.78) (-8.91) (-4.04) (-7.74)
Firm Age [Ln] 0.0076 -0.0092 0.010 0.0064 -0.0063 0.0094 0.0064 -0.0059 0.0095 0.0072 -0.012 0.0093
(0.83) (-0.25) (1.16) (0.71) (-0.17) (1.06) (0.71) (-0.16) (1.07) (0.79) (-0.33) (1.05)
Market-to-Book -0.00012 0.00041** 0.00013 -0.00012 0.00042** 0.00013 -0.00011 0.00042** 0.00013 -0.00012 0.00041** 0.00013
(-0.53) (2.18) (0.68) (-0.51) (2.18) (0.69) (-0.48) (2.18) (0.71) (-0.54) (2.17) (0.68)
HGB Accounting [Dummy] 0.048** 0.057** 0.043** 0.046** 0.058** 0.042* 0.043* 0.058** 0.041* 0.047** 0.056** 0.041*
(2.08) (2.18) (2.01) (1.97) (2.18) (1.95) (1.85) (2.20) (1.90) (2.01) (2.13) (1.92)
Mean Industry Level 0.85*** 0.90*** 0.87*** 0.86*** 0.89*** 0.87*** 0.85*** 0.89*** 0.86*** 0.85*** 0.90*** 0.87***
(7.22) (7.05) (7.36) (7.28) (7.06) (7.40) (7.23) (7.05) (7.35) (7.23) (7.08) (7.37)
Constant -0.22* -0.90*** -0.39*** -0.22 -0.91*** -0.39*** -0.21 -0.93*** -0.39*** -0.22 -0.88*** -0.38***
(-1.65) (-2.95) (-2.97) (-1.61) (-2.98) (-2.78) (-1.58) (-3.04) (-2.93) (-1.63) (-2.89) (-2.93)
Observations 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246 3246
Number of clusters 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544 544
Adj. R-squared  0.19 0,45 0,19 0.19 0,45 0,19 0.19 0,45 0,19 0.19 0,45 0,19
Model OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE OLS FE RE
Table 10: Total Payout Ratio (TPR) - Family Influence
Note: A detailed description of the variables can be found in table 2. Time and industry dummies are included. Models are OLS, random-effects or firm-fixed effects regressions. The standard errors of the coefficients are corrected for serial correlation on a firm
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